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DISSERTATION ABSTRACT 
 
Jingjing Huang 
 
Doctor of Philosophy  
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June 2014 
 
Title: The Role of Taxes in Foreign Earnings Management: Implications for Pricing of 
Foreign Earnings 
 
 
U.S. multinational corporations are well known for shifting income to low tax 
foreign subsidiaries to avoid U.S. income tax. Yet little is known about how multinational 
corporations opportunistically use low tax foreign subsidiaries for financial reporting 
purpose. Understanding this question has implications for U.S. accounting regulators to 
set enforcement targets. Using worldwide consolidated financial statements, I examine 
the role of taxes for multinational corporations to manage earnings in foreign 
subsidiaries. I find that by managing earnings in low tax foreign countries, multinational 
corporations can reduce the effective tax rate on pretax accrual earnings by an average of 
4.3%. To examine the implication of opportunistic foreign earnings management on 
investors’ equity valuation, I find evidence that investors do not seem to overvalue 
foreign managed earnings compared to domestic managed earnings, though foreign 
earnings are on average valued higher than domestic earnings. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
This study examines the role of taxes for U.S. multinational corporations (MNCs) to 
manage accounting earnings in foreign subsidiaries, and how investors recognize MNCs’ foreign 
earnings management when valuing foreign versus domestic earnings. Because intra-MNC 
income shifting using intercompany transactions (such as transfer pricing through royalty 
payments) is eliminated in the consolidated financial statements, earnings management that 
affects consolidated net income requires real operation activities from different affiliates, which 
distinguishes my research question from the studies related to tax-motivated income shifting 
between the U.S. and foreign affiliates (Collins et al. 1998; Klassen and Laplante 2012; Dyreng 
and Markle 2013).  
For each country in which a MNC operates, the scale of operation in that country 
determines the size of potential accrual management that is perceived to have low detection risk. 
For a given amount of pretax earnings accrued in a foreign country with a lower tax rate than the 
U.S., the foreign subsidiary can report higher after-tax earnings than a comparable U.S. 
subsidiary due to the lower income tax expense. Therefore, within the perceived safe limits of 
accrual earnings management, accruing additional pretax earnings in low tax foreign countries 
can thus reduce the amount of pretax earnings required to achieve a specified target level of after-
tax earnings, which, to the extent that earnings management is costly, can reduce the cost of 
earnings management.  
Since the U.S. has two different reporting systems for tax and accounting, one might 
expect MNCs to avoid reporting taxes on inflated accounting earnings. However, doing so leads 
to a large book-tax difference, either temporary or permanent, which can signal poor earnings 
quality to regulators, investors and auditors (Mills 1998; Phillips et al. 2003; Hanlon 2005; 
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Hanlon et al. 2012). Based on a sample of firms that have overstated their accounting earnings, 
Erickson et al. (2004) illustrate the tax cost associated with accounting earnings management: 
these firms not only record but even pay taxes on the inflated accounting earnings. To lower the 
tax cost of foreign earnings management, MNCs can designate overstated foreign earnings as 
permanently reinvested according to Accounting Principles Board Statement No. 23 (APB 23).1  
Prior research on foreign earnings management predicts that MNCs might prefer to 
manage earnings in tax havens because tax haven countries have zero or extremely low tax rates 
(Dyreng et al. 2012). Despite of the tax advantage, I suggest that tax havens might only capture 
part of foreign earnings management activities due to their income shifting role. Both anecdotal 
and empirical evidence shows that tax haven subsidiaries lack of real economic investments and 
rely on income from intercompany transactions (Desai et al. 2006a; Desai et al. 2006b).2 If a 
MNC inflates accounting accruals in tax havens, the inflated accruals based on intercompany 
transactions are eliminated during worldwide accounting consolidation, meanwhile the inflated 
accruals from real operation in tax havens only making a limited impact on the consolidated 
earnings. Thus, I expand the foreign earnings management prediction to other low tax foreign 
countries and provide evidence on the amount of tax expense that MNCs can reduce through 
foreign earnings management. 
                                                           
1
 If a MNC records or pays taxes on managed earnings based on the low foreign tax rates instead of the U.S. 
tax rate, this could lead to a decrease in the effective tax rate and an increase in the permanent book tax 
difference. In the MNC’s effective tax rate reconciliation schedule, this shows as a deduction from the U.S. 
statutory tax rate due to foreign statutory tax rate differences. Compared to the book tax difference caused 
by accounting items such as stock options or goodwill, the difference due to foreign statutory tax rates is 
less likely to raise a red flag for earnings management.  
 
2
 In May 2013, Senator Levin (D-Mich) chaired a Senate hearing on Apple to shed light on the role of tax 
haven subsidiaries. Apple Sales International (ASI), an Irish subsidiary of the Apple Inc, hired no 
employees until 2011 but holds economic rights of Apple’s intellectual properties worldwide. For other 
affiliates to use the intellectual properties, they need to pay royalties to ASI. In 2011, ASI received 22 
billion income and paid 10 million taxes to Ireland based on the income related to the sales to Irish 
customers. As Apple negotiated a special tax rate of less than 2% with the Irish government, I infer that 
ASI had about 500 million Irish source income, only 2% of the total 22 billion income received, which 
means almost 98% income in ASI is received from other Apple affiliates through royalty payments.  
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I next investigate the implication of foreign earnings management on foreign earnings 
valuation. When valuing MNCs’ foreign versus domestic earnings, researchers show that 
investors consistently value foreign earnings higher than domestic earnings, and attribute the 
finding to foreign markets having better growth opportunities than the domestic market (Bodnar 
and Weintrop 1997; Collins et al. 1998; Christophe 2002; Hope et al. 2008; Hope et al. 2009). 
However, to the extent that MNCs opportunistically manage earnings in foreign countries, 
domestic investors may attribute inflated foreign earnings to real foreign growth. The investors’ 
failure to differentiate foreign earnings management from foreign earnings growth could lead to 
the foreign managed earnings being overvalued. Thus, I investigate how investors price foreign 
managed earnings compared to domestic managed earnings. 
Identifying earnings management in foreign subsidiaries of U.S. MNCs with worldwide 
consolidated financial statements presents an empirical challenge. To deal with this, I first apply 
the Dechow and Dichev (2002) discretionary accrual model to separately identify worldwide 
discretionary and nondiscretionary accruals. Next, I estimate the tax rate on discretionary versus 
nondiscretionary accruals using an approach adapted from Dyreng and Lindsey (2009). 
Specifically, I regress total income tax expense on contemporaneous pretax accounting earnings 
components, including discretionary and non-discretionary accruals, and interpret the coefficient 
on each earnings component as the effective tax rate (ETR) applicable to the specific earnings 
component. The salient feature of the design is that by comparing the coefficients on 
discretionary and nondiscretionary accruals, I can compare the ETR on discretionary accruals to 
the ETR on nondiscretionary accruals. Because nondiscretionary accruals reflect activities in both 
U.S. and foreign countries, I expect the ETR on nondiscretionary accruals to reflect a weighted 
average of U.S. and foreign corporate income tax rates. To the extent that MNCs concentrate 
earnings management in low tax foreign countries, I expect the ETR on discretionary accruals to 
be lower than the ETR on nondiscretionary accruals.  
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Due to better growth opportunities, foreign earnings are on average valued higher than 
domestic earnings. But to the extent that opportunistically managed foreign earnings cannot 
translate into future cash flow, managed foreign earnings will not be valued higher than domestic 
managed earnings. To estimate managed earnings derived from foreign and domestic sources, I 
follow Dyreng et al. (2012) by regressing discretionary accruals on foreign and domestic pretax 
earnings, the coefficients of which can be interpreted as the rates at which discretionary accruals 
are derived from foreign and domestic pretax earnings. Multiplying the coefficients by foreign 
and domestic pretax earnings, I can estimate foreign and domestic discretionary accruals. To the 
extent that investors can detect opportunistic foreign earnings management, I do not expect 
foreign discretionary accruals to be valued higher than domestic discretionary accruals.   
Based on a sample of 11,356 U.S. MNC observations between 1988 and 2011, I find that 
the ETR on discretionary accruals is on average 4.3 percentage points lower than the ETR on 
nondiscretionary accruals. I subsequently perform additional tests to corroborate the finding. First, 
I collect a benchmark sample of 13,736 observations for U.S. domestic companies in the same 
sample period. As domestic companies have no access to foreign subsidiaries, I find the ETR on 
discretionary accruals is not significantly different from the ETR on nondiscretionary accruals 
(the ETR difference is 0.6 percentage points). In recent three decades, the U.S. gradually becomes 
one of the highest tax countries due to continuous foreign tax cut, I find the evidence in support 
of increasing foreign earnings management throughout the sample period.  
Next, I separately identify a subsample of U.S. domestic firms that become MNCs during 
the sample period. Before the foreign expansion, the ETR on discretionary accruals is not 
significantly different from the ETR on nondiscretionary accruals. Associated with the foreign 
expansion, the incremental ETR on discretionary accruals is 3.9 percentage points lower than the 
incremental ETR on nondiscretionary accruals. The results are robust after I correct the sample 
selection issue for MNCs. Finally, I separately use MNCs’ foreign and domestic ETRs to test 
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foreign and domestic earnings management. To the extent that foreign discretionary accruals are 
opportunistically concentrated in low tax countries, I predict and find that the foreign ETR on 
discretionary accruals is significantly lower than the foreign ETR on nondiscretionary accruals. 
On the other hand, MNCs are less likely to lower domestic income tax expense on domestic 
managed earnings. I predict and find that the domestic ETR on discretionary accruals is not 
significantly different from the domestic ETR on nondiscretionary accruals. In robustness tests, I 
find consistent evidence of foreign earnings management by using a different tax rate measure 
(weighted statutory tax rate).  
To test how investors price foreign versus domestic discretionary accruals, I find that 
while foreign earnings are on average valued significantly higher than domestic earnings, foreign 
managed earnings are not valued significantly different from domestic managed earnings. 
Specifically, a one dollar increase in predicted foreign (domestic) discretionary accruals is valued 
at $1.245 (1.446) and the marginal valuation difference $0.201 is not significantly different from 
zero. The evidence suggests that investors price foreign discretionary accruals in a way consistent 
with the opportunistic earnings management hypothesis. The market valuation results are robust 
to discretionary accruals adjusted by performance matching and earnings components after tax.  
When examining the foreign earnings management of MNCs, I implicitly assume that 
managers are on average motivated to manage earnings. Next, I focus on different settings in 
which earnings management is likely to occur. I do not find significant evidence of foreign 
earnings management in the first two settings where earnings might be managed to avoid a small 
decline, or to avoid missing analysts’ forecasts. The lack of significant evidence is probably due 
to the data limitation that tests discretionary accruals at the foreign subsidiary level with 
incentives at the top consolidated level. To identify firm-years that are most likely to manage 
foreign earnings, I compare firm-years with high income increasing discretionary accruals to 
firm-years with low income increasing discretionary accruals and find that for firm-years with 
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high income increasing discretionary accruals, the ETR on discretionary accruals is 13.2% lower 
than the ETR on nondiscretionary accruals; while for firm-years with low income increasing 
discretionary accruals, the ETR on discretionary accruals is not significantly different from the 
ETR on nondiscretionary accruals. Furthermore, consistent with the foreign earnings management 
prediction, firm-years with high income increasing discretionary accruals have lower foreign ETR 
than firm-years with low income increasing discretionary accruals.   
The finding of earnings management in low tax foreign subsidiaries has implications for 
accounting regulators. In recent years, MNCs are under increasing scrutiny from legislators and 
the White House administration for shifting income to low tax foreign countries, which erodes the 
U.S. tax revenue.3 However, less attention is paid to how MNCs might opportunistically 
manipulate accounting in low tax foreign subsidiaries. Thus, this study intends to inform 
accounting regulators about the significance of foreign earnings management, and help 
accounting regulators to set enforcement targets.  
For U.S. auditors, this study provides a test using worldwide consolidated financial 
statements to identify foreign earnings management activities. This is helpful for U.S. auditors 
who often face cross border auditing challenges. Daniel L. Goelzer, the former PCAOB acting 
chairman, pointed out that U.S. auditors do not have sufficient understanding of foreign affiliate 
personnel and control environments, such as whether foreign personnel are familiar with U.S. 
GAAP and whether a foreign affiliate’s work is adequately supervised.4  
                                                           
3
 In 2012 and 2013, Senator Carl Levin (D-Mich) chaired two senate hearings on how MNCs (e.g., 
Microsoft, Hewlett-Packard and Apple) shift profits from the U.S. to low tax foreign subsidiaries such as 
tax havens. Both legislators and the White House have made a series of proposals to restrict income 
shifting (Gravelle 2013). 
 
4
 The speech of chairman Goelzer is available from  
http://pcaobus.org/News/Speech/Pages/12072009_Goelzer_AICPA_Speech.aspx.  
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This study contributes to the extant literature in several ways. First, it provides direct 
evidence on the role of taxes in foreign earnings management. Besides extending Durnev et al 
(2011) and Dyreng et al (2012), the study adds the implication of foreign earnings management 
on foreign earnings valuation. Second, Hanlon and Heitzman (2010) review a growing body of 
research suggesting that tax disclosures provide value relevant information for investors. Adding 
to the extant research, the evidence in this paper shows that investors can infer book effective tax 
rates from earnings management locations, which seems to be reflected in investors’ equity 
valuation.  
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CHAPTER II 
LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESES 
Foreign Earnings Management 
Suppose a MNC wants to increase after-tax earnings by a specified target amount, the 
company can choose to inflate pretax accruals in the U.S., foreign subsidiaries or both. 5 The 
earnings management decision depends on perceived earnings management cost, including the 
likelihood of detection. One factor that influences detection risk is country-level investor 
protection environment. Leuz et al. (2003) describe earnings management as a rent extraction 
activity used by managers to obscure true economic performance and conceal private benefits 
from outsiders. By comparing earnings management across 31 countries, Leuz et al. (2003) find 
that a strong investor protection environment is associated with less earnings management 
activity. Thus, to reduce detection risk, MNCs may manage earnings in affiliates with weak 
investor protection. Consistent with the prediction, Dyreng et al. (2012) find that MNCs with a 
higher concentration of subsidiaries in weak rule of law countries have more discretionary 
accruals. Beuselinck et al. (2010) find similar evidence for the European subsidiaries of EU 
MNCs.6 
                                                           
5
 This study is agnostic regarding to whether the foreign earnings management is carried out at the 
headquarter level and/or the foreign subsidiary level. Motivated to meet the market’s expectation, the top 
management determines the magnitude and location of earnings management, generating an earnings target 
for each subsidiary. The top management can either manipulate subsidiary accrual earnings during 
worldwide accounting consolidation, or delegate earnings management to foreign subsidiary managers by 
setting specified earnings targets for subsidiaries. The latter is likely when foreign subsidiaries have weak 
control environments and are not well supervised by headquarter accounting offices. See the example in 
Appendix B.  
 
6
 Though this study focuses on the role of taxes in foreign earnings management, I acknowledge investor 
protection environment could also influence foreign earnings management. In untabulated tests, after 
controlling for the investor protection environment of foreign subsidiaries in which MNCs operate, I find 
consistent evidence on the role of taxes in foreign earnings management.  
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In addition to investor protection environment, prior studies predict that tax havens might 
exacerbate foreign earnings management (Durnev et al. 2011; Dyreng et al. 2012). This is mainly 
for two reasons: first, tax havens have banking secrecy protection, which allows banks to refuse 
to share clients’ information with foreign regulatory agencies.7 As MNCs set up complex shelters 
in tax havens to avoid taxes, the lack of transparency allows managers to conceal rent extraction 
activities such as earnings management from outside investors. Second, MNCs can reduce 
potential tax cost by managing earnings in tax havens. To the extent that the MNC records or 
pays taxes on managed earnings to reduce detection risk (Erickson et al. 2004), earnings 
management in tax havens can minimize the tax cost. Empirically, Dyreng et al. (2012) find that 
MNCs with higher concentration of subsidiaries in tax havens have more discretionary accruals. 
Similarly, Durnev et al. (2011) show that MNCs with a higher Offshore Attitude Index exhibit 
more discretionary accruals and more real earnings manageme+nt. 8 
In this study, I focus on the role of taxes in foreign earnings management and extend the 
prediction beyond tax havens. Recent evidence shows that MNCs operate in tax havens mainly 
for income shifting purpose. Desai et al (2006a) find that MNCs with more income shifting 
benefits such as higher investment growth in non-haven countries and more intra-firm trade are 
more likely to operate in tax havens.9 Compared to the importance of income shifting, the role of 
economic investments in tax havens is less prominent. Hines (2005) shows that in year 1999, 
while MNCs report 30% net income from tax havens, MNCs only report 8.4% property, plant and 
                                                           
7
 Though worldwide leaders agreed to end the secrecy protection of tax havens (OECD 2010), the OECD 
2012 progress report shows that most haven countries still have legal deficiencies to meet the transparent 
information exchange standards (OECD 2012).   
 
8
 The Offshore Attitude Index is calculated based on tax havens, legal regimes, political stability and 
economic crime pollution for each foreign country. At each firm-year level, the authors construct an 
average index based on the weighted average of Offshore index from each foreign countries that the MNC 
operates in. Higher value of the index is associated with lower taxation, weaker legal enforcement, less 
stable political regimes and more economic crimes.  
 
9
 Desai et al (2006b) use an analytical approach to show that the likelihood of income shifting to tax havens 
increases with the return to investments in higher tax regions. 
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equipment investments in tax havens. As income shifting relies on inter-company transactions, 
inflated earnings based on shifted income are eliminated in consolidated financial statements. For 
example, tax haven affiliates often hold economic rights of intangible properties and charge 
royalties when other affiliates use them. Though a tax haven affiliate can inflate royalty revenue 
from other affiliates, the inflated royalty revenue is eliminated during worldwide accounting 
consolidation. On the other hand, if tax haven affiliates inflate earnings from their own operation, 
the impact on consolidated earnings is limited due to the small operation size in tax havens.  
When choosing earnings management locations, companies not only consider lowering 
tax cost but also factor in the overall detection risk. The scale of operation in a given country 
determines the size of accrual management perceived to have low detection risk. Under the limits 
of accrual earnings management across countries, MNCs would prefer to manage earnings in low 
tax countries. Thus, while it is unlikely to have a corner solution in which all earnings 
management takes place in low tax countries, MNCs can still opportunistically concentrate 
managed accruals in low tax countries.  
To provide some anecdotal evidence, I use the empirical method developed in Section 3.1 
to identify firm-years likely managing foreign earnings and corroborate the results by searching 
descriptive information. For example, Symbol Technologies Inc, a software company in New 
York, might manage foreign earnings in year 1998 and 1999.10 By inspecting 10-Ks in both years 
(see Appendix B), I find that out of the 19 foreign countries in which Symbol Technologies 
operate, 12 countries (63%) have lower corporate tax rates than the U.S.11 Moreover, out of the 
worldwide revenue, foreign sales revenue account for 45% and 42.4%, separately in 1998 and 
1999. The evidence from 10-Ks indicates opportunities for foreign earnings management: the 
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  I select the firm years because they are in the top quartile of income increasing discretionary accruals 
and Table 6 shows the subsample has significant foreign earnings management evidence.  
 
11
  I obtain the corporate tax rate data from the KPMG Corporate Tax Rate Survey. Only the tax data of 
South Africa in year 1998 and 1999 is not available.  
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company extensively operated in low tax foreign countries and claimed to have high foreign sales 
revenue. Based on the SEC Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Release (AAER), Symbol 
Technologies had in fact overstated sales revenue in 1998 and 1999 through channel stuffing, and 
manipulated inventory levels and accounts receivables to conceal the revenue recognition 
schemes. Though the AAER does not specify the country in which the revenue manipulation 
occurs,12 it is likely that foreign sale revenue had been manipulated as the company later 
acknowledged its internal control weakness in foreign subsidiaries.13  
The first hypothesis in the alternative form is:  
H1: While accruing nondiscretionary earnings from worldwide operation, MNCs 
concentrate discretionary earnings in low tax countries.  
Foreign versus Domestic Earnings Valuation 
In this section, I examine the implication of foreign earnings management on foreign 
earnings valuation. Previous studies consistently find higher foreign earnings response 
coefficients (ERCs) than domestic ERCs (Collins et al. 1998; Hope et al. 2008). To explain the 
evidence, Bodnar and Weintrop (1997) suggest that foreign expansion represents business 
opportunities in less exploited markets, in which MNCs likely establish and maintain market 
monopoly power for a finite period. The superior foreign market power means higher return on 
foreign investments than domestic investments, and foreign earnings are valued higher than 
domestic earnings. Consistent with this prediction, Desai et al. (2011) compare direct investments 
                                                           
12
 In most AAER cases, the SEC accuses companies of overstating revenue or understating expense at a 
firm-wide consolidated level without specifying the location in which fraudulent activities occur (Dechow 
et al. 2011). 
 
13
 In the 10-K/A of year 2002, the company acknowledged that each foreign subsidiary was responsible for 
its own financial reporting and was lack of the headquarters’ supervision, and the company former 
management created an environment that encouraged inappropriate activities to meet forecasted financial 
results. However, the company did not disclose restated foreign sales revenue, foreign tax or permanently 
reinvested foreign earnings.  
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abroad to repatriated investment returns between year 1982 and 2010, and find that cash flows 
received from foreign investments exceed 160 percent of net foreign investments. To ensure that 
the higher foreign ERCs are driven by foreign growth, Bodnar and Weintrop (1997) show that the 
higher foreign ERCs only exist in firms that have more foreign sales growth than domestic sales 
growth.  
Christophe (2002) attempts to challenge the role of growth in explaining the evidence of 
higher foreign ERCs relative to domestic ERCs. Alternatively, he suggests that when foreign 
earnings increase, investors perceive future growth opportunities; when foreign earnings decrease, 
investors, facing information asymmetry of foreign operations, might infer that managers have 
free cash flow problem abroad or managers are unwilling to abandon inefficient projects due to 
high sunk costs. As a result of the asymmetrically perceived agency cost, investors react more 
strongly to foreign earnings decrease than foreign earnings increase. By partitioning his sample 
into firms with positive and negative changes in foreign earnings, the author finds that foreign 
ERCs are higher than domestic ERCs only when foreign earnings decrease. But the author 
acknowledges that foreign growth can still explain the finding: when foreign earnings decrease, 
investors realize they have overestimated foreign market growth prospects and they discount 
stock price accordingly, leading to a larger foreign ERC. Consistent with the explanation, the 
author finds when foreign earnings decrease, the ERC magnitude increases with growth 
opportunities proxied by Tobin’s q ratio. Thus, the results of Christophe (2002) still support the 
role of growth in explaining the evidence of higher foreign ERCs relative to domestic ERCs.  
However, if MNCs opportunistically manage accruals in foreign countries (“opportunistic 
hypothesis”), managed foreign earnings are based on managers’ discretion, instead of real 
operations that generate future cash flow (Guay et al. 1996). Managers often manage accruals to 
hide current poor performance by overestimating revenue and/or underestimating expense, and 
13 
 
thus to the extent that foreign managed earning fail to translate into future cash flow, the foreign 
managed earnings will not be valued higher than the domestic managed earnings.  
Though the opportunistic earnings management hypothesis is well supported in empirical 
studies,14 there is a strand of research that suggests managers manage earnings to convey private 
future information and current managed earnings might predict future cash flow (“private 
information hypothesis”). DeFond and Park (1997) suggest that when current performance is poor 
(good) and expected performance is good (poor), managers shift future (current) good earnings 
into the current (future) period to reduce the chance of dismissal.15 Under the private information 
hypothesis, to the extent that earnings are managed to convey future cash flow information, and 
since foreign earnings have better growth opportunities than domestic earnings, foreign managed 
earnings might be valued higher than domestic managed earnings.  
Based on the opportunistic earnings management hypothesis, I predict that investors will 
not value foreign managed earnings higher than domestic managed earnings. If the prediction is 
rejected, it could be because either foreign earnings are managed to convey private information or 
investors fail to detect the foreign earnings management. My second hypothesis is stated in null 
form below: 
                                                           
14
 Researchers find consistent empirical evidence supporting the opportunistic earnings management 
hypothesis in settings such as capital issuing, merger and acquisition and manager compensation. Teoh et al. 
(1998a, 1998b) find that managers opportunistically increase accrual earnings before IPOs or seasoned 
equity offerings, and that the market overprices these abnormal accruals. When investigating stock-for-
stock acquisitions and mergers, Erickson and Wang (1996) find acquiring firms manage earnings upward in 
the periods prior to the merger agreement. By examining executive bonus plans conditioned on accounting 
earnings, Holthausen et al. (1995) find that CEOs use income decreasing accruals when their bonuses are at 
maximum. Studies that relate earnings management to equity compensation incentives show that equity 
incentives are positively associated with the use of discretionary accruals (Bergstresser and Philippon 2006; 
Larcker et al. 2007; Cheng and Warfield 2005). 
 
15
 Following the study of DeFond and Park (1997), Sankar and Subramanyam (2001) use an analytical 
approach to show that with the objective to maximize the utility of compensation as a function of reported 
earnings and price, managers have incentives to smooth income and communicate future private 
information through reported earnings in the current period. Based on an indirect approach, Altamuro et al. 
(2005) find that SAB 101, an accounting regulation that aims to reduce managerial discretion in 
accelerating revenue, leads to less informative accounting earnings. They suggest that the finding implies 
managers accelerate revenue to signal value-relevant information of future performance. 
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H2: While investors value foreign earnings higher than domestic earnings on average, 
investors do not value foreign discretionary accruals higher than domestic discretionary accruals. 
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CHAPTER III 
RESEARCH DESIGN 
Foreign Earnings Management 
Using worldwide consolidated financial statements, I attempt to identify the role of taxes 
in foreign earnings management. The basic intuition is that as MNCs concentrate earnings 
management in low tax foreign countries and carry out operating activities worldwide, managed 
earnings are on average subject to a lower corporate income tax rate than unmanaged earnings. In 
other words, the tax expense per dollar of pretax managed earnings is lower than the tax expense 
per dollar of pretax unmanaged earnings.  
To reflect the tax expense recorded on pretax financial earnings, I construct effective tax 
rate (ETR) as below:16  
ETRit = 


 (1) 
For firm i in fiscal year t, TXTit is total worldwide tax expense and PIit is worldwide 
pretax income.17 I rearrange terms in equation (1) and have the following: 
TXTit = PIit × ETRit (2) 
Next, I decompose pretax income (PIit) into different earnings components: 
PIit = OCFit + WCit + NWCit               (3) 
                                                           
16
 The ETR defined in this study is interchangeably addressed as Financial or GAAP ETR in other studies 
(Graham et al. 2011; Hanlon and Heitzman 2012). ETR captures total tax expense that affects accounting 
earnings, which is consistent with the objective to examine earnings management in this study. 
 
17
 The pretax income is before minority interests. Hanlon (2003) notes that most companies calculate ETR 
as total book tax expense over pretax income from continuing operations. The definition of pretax income 
is also consistent with Dyreng and Lindsey (2009) as they calculate pretax income as a sum of foreign and 
domestic pretax income from continuing operations.  
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In equation (3), I separate pretax income (PIit) into pretax operating cash flow (OCFit), 
pretax working capital accruals (WCit) and pretax non-working capital accruals (NWCit). The 
pretax operating cash flow is defined as cash flow from operation (OANCF), plus cash tax paid 
(TXPD), less extraordinary items (XIDOC) for firm i in fiscal year t; The pretax working capital 
accruals are defined as the change in accounts receivable (RECCH), plus the change in inventory 
(INVCH) and other assets (AOLOCH), minus the change in accounts payable (APALCH).18 I use 
the cash flow approach to construct working capital accruals because Hribar and Collins (2002) 
point out that compared to accruals calculated from cash flow statement, accruals based on 
balance sheet might be subject to measurement error.19 The pretax nonworking capital accruals 
are the difference between pretax income, operating cash flow and working capital accruals. 
Based on equation (3), I continue to decompose working capital accruals (WCit) into managed 
and unmanaged accrual components: 
PIit = OCFit + DAit + NDAit + NWCit.              (4) 
In equation (4), discretionary accruals (DAit) are working capital accruals subject to 
managers’ discretion and nondiscretionary accruals (NDAit) are working capital accruals based on 
operating cash flow activities. I illustrate how I calculate DAit and NDAit in section 3.2.  
By inserting decomposed pretax income from equation (4) back to equation (2), I have 
the following: 
TXTit = (OCFit + DAit + NDAit + NWCit )× ETRit.             (5) 
                                                           
18
  The definition is similar to Dechow and Dichev (2002). Based on Compustat items, the calculation of 
pretax working capital accruals can be expressed as WCt = -(∆Accounts receivable (RECCH) + ∆Inventory 
(INVCH) + ∆Accounts payable (APALCH) + ∆Other assets (AOLOCH)). Note all data items are from the 
cash flow statement.  
 
19
 Hribar and Collins (2002) suggest that accruals based on balance sheet might be subject to measurement 
error in events such as mergers and acquisitions, divestitures, and foreign operations through subsidiaries.  
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In equation (5), the ETRit is constrained to be the same for all earnings components. 
However, to the extent that MNCs concentrate earnings management activities in low tax foreign 
countries while conducting operations worldwide, the effective tax rate applicable to managed 
earnings is expected to be lower than unmanaged earnings. Thus, I relax the coefficient constraint 
of equation (5) and allow ETRit to vary with each earnings component as below:  
TXTit = OCFit×ETROCF,it + DAit×ETRDA,it + NDAit×ETRNDA,it  
+ NWCit×ETRNWC,it.             (6) 
In equation (6), each ETR term can be interpreted as the average tax expense per dollar of 
pretax earnings component, or equivalently, the ETR applicable to each pretax earnings 
component. Dyreng and Lindsey (2009) describe the ETR as a function of firm characteristics 
such as the presence of net operating loss carry forward, firm size, debt, advertising and R&D. 
Following Dyreng and Lindsey (2009), I estimate each ETR term as below: 
ETROCF,it = θa1 + θa2NOLit + θa3Sizeit + θa4Debtit + θa5ADit + θa6R&Dit,        (7a) 
ETRDA,it  = θb1 + θb2NOLit + θb3Sizeit + θb4Debtit + θb5ADit + θb6R&Dit,        (7b) 
ETRNDA,it = θc1 + θc2NOLit + θc3Sizeit + θc4Debtit + θc5ADit + θc6R&Dit,        (7c) 
ETRNWC,it = θd1 + θd2NOLit + θd3Sizeit + θd4Debtit + θd5ADit + θd6R&Dit,        (7d) 
where NOLit is equal to one if firm i has net operating loss carry forward (TLCF) at the 
beginning of fiscal year t; Sizeit is the natural logarithm of total assets (AT); Debtit is the sum of 
short-term (DLC) and long-term debt (DLTT); ADit is advertising expense (XAD); R&Dit is 
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research and development expense (XRD).20 By substituting equations (7a), (7b), (7c) and (7d) 
into equation (6), I have the following,  
TXTit = θa1OCFit + θb1DAit + θc1NDAit + θd1NWCit + ∑ 	
 ×    
+ ∑ 	 × 

  + ∑ 	 × 

   
+ ∑ 	 × 

 .            (8a) 
Where   is the kth control variable identified in equations (7a), (7b), (7c) and 
(7d). To estimate equation (8a) using the ordinary least squares technique, I add an intercept term, 
constitutive terms (∑  ) and an error term to equation (8a).21 This generates the 
following: 
TXTit = θ0 + θa1OCFit + θb1DAit + θc1NDAit + θd1NWCit  
+ ∑ 	
 × 

  + ∑ 	 × 

   
+ ∑ 	 × 

  + ∑ 	 × 

   
+ ∑ 	

  + uit.             (8b) 
                                                           
20
 Similar to Dyreng and Lindsey (2009), I replace variables with missing values by zero.  
 
21
 Though the theoretical expression of equation (8a) omits constitutive terms (∑  ), it is 
necessary to include the constitutive terms for empirical regression to avoid coefficient bias. Omitting the 
constitutive terms relies on the theoretical assumption that they are not correlated with pretax income and 
pretax income interacted with the constitutive terms (Greene 2003, pp. 148–149). Empirically, the 
accounting constitutive terms should be correlated with pretax income as they affect accounting income 
directly or indirectly. Second, omitting the constitutive terms means that when pretax earnings components 
are zero, constitutive terms have no impact on the dependent variable total book tax expense. However, 
even for companies with zero pretax income, they may still report book tax expense due to the constitutive 
control terms. For example, net operating loss carryfowards are recognized as deferred tax assets for 
financial reporting purpose. Third, Brambor et al. (2005) note a general rule of thumb that even with strong 
theoretical reasons to exclude constitutive terms, researchers should first estimate a fully specified model to 
examine whether constitutive terms have explanatory power. In empirical tests reported in section 5, results 
consistently show that the constitutive control variables have explanatory power for total book tax expense.  
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In equation (8b), the coefficients of interest are θb1 and θc1. θb1 (θc1) is interpreted as the 
average ETR applicable to discretionary (nondiscretionary) accruals.22 To the extent that MNCs 
manage earnings in low tax foreign countries while conducting operating activities worldwide 
(H1), the ETR applicable to discretionary accruals (θb1) should be lower than the ETR applicable 
to nondiscretionary accruals (θc1). Thus, H1 leads to the empirical prediction that θb1 < θc1. To 
directly test the coefficient difference between discretionary and nondiscretionary accruals, I 
substitute working capital accruals (WCit) for nondiscretionary accruals (NDAit) in equation (8b). 
After rearranging terms, I generate a mathematically equivalent expression of equation (8b) as 
below: 
TXTit  = β0 + βa1OCFit + βb1DAit + βc1WCit + βd1NWCit + ∑ β
 ×    
+ ∑ β × 

  + ∑ β × 

   
+ ∑ β × 

  + ∑ β

  + uit.           (9) 
Compared to equation (8b), the coefficient on DAit (βb1) is now the difference between 
the ETR applicable to discretionary accruals and the ETR applicable to nondiscretionary accruals. 
23
 Under H1, I predict βb1 < 0. There are two advantages of using equation (9) in empirical 
estimation. First, it can directly test the coefficient difference between discretionary and 
                                                           
22
 To facilitate coefficient interpretation, I subtract each continuous variable by its mean in empirical 
regression. Thus, θb1 (θc1) can be interpreted as the average ETR applicable to discretionary 
(nondiscretionary) accruals for a firm-year with average size, debt, advertising expense and R&D expense. 
The mean centering approach is consistent with Dyreng and Lindsey (2009).  
 
23
 In equation (9), the coefficient of discretionary accruals is (βb1 + βc1) and the coefficient of 
nondiscretionary accruals is βc1. If the ETR applicable to discretionary accruals is lower than 
nondiscretionary accruals, then βb1 < 0. This is a mathematically equivalent expression of θb1 < θc1 in 
equation (8b). 
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nondiscretionary accruals. Second, I correct the correlation of residuals across firms and across 
time, and thus the significance of βb1 is less likely inflated.24 
Discretionary and Nondiscretionary Accruals 
To identify discretionary accruals for firm i in fiscal year t (DAit), I rely on the Dechow 
and Dichev (2002) discretionary accrual model,25 which is estimated as below, 
WCit = b0 + b1 OCFi,t-1 + b2OCFit + b3OCFi,t+1 + eit.                                                 (10) 
In equation (10), WCit is pretax working capital accruals for firm i in fiscal year t; on the 
right hand side, I include past, current and future pretax operating cash flow; the residual term (eit) 
is working capital accruals unexplained by operating cash flow realization, and is defined as 
discretionary accruals for firm i in fiscal year t (DAit). Nondiscretionary accruals (NDAit) are 
calculated as working capital accruals minus discretionary accruals for firm i in fiscal year t.26 For 
robustness check, I also use performance matched discretionary accruals for empirical tests in 
section 6.2 (Kothari et al. 2005; Francis et al. 2005). 
 
                                                           
24
  Firm fixed effect is not used in the regression because firm fixed effect changes the ETR estimates 
interpretation, which deviates from the purpose of H1.  
 
25
 The basic intuition behind the Dechow and Dichev (2002) model is that accounting accruals, under the 
GAAP, should shift or adjust the recognition of cash flows over time. Thus, accounting accruals should 
theoretically map into cash flow realization. Dechow and Dichev (2002) predict that b1>0, b2<0, and b3>0. 
To the extent that accruals are unexplained by cash flow realization, the residual accrual component is 
discretionary accruals.  
 
26
 Several subsequent studies try to modify the discretionary accrual model of Dechow and Dichev (2002). 
Wysocki (2008) points out that the model fails to capture situations in which managers opportunistically 
use discretionary accruals to offset negative shocks to current period cash flows. In this case, earnings 
management leads to a negative association between operating cash flows in the current period and 
working capital accruals (b2<0), which is not captured by the residual term (eit). Although this type of 
earnings management is not captured by my discretionary accrual measure, it should weaken my result to 
the extent that such earnings management is prevalent. White (2012) proposes to use accrual balances 
instead of changes in accruals to reflect earnings management from a particular previous period. However, 
in this study, I focus on the ETR applicable to current period earnings components and I should use the 
discretionary accrual model that identifies discretionary accruals in the current period. 
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Foreign versus Domestic Earnings Valuation 
To investigate how investors value foreign managed earnings relative to domestic 
managed earnings under H2, I build on the Bodnar and Weintrop (1997) earnings valuation 
model and augment with firm characteristic control variables from Faulkender and Wang 
(2006).27 The market valuation equation is estimated as below, 
rit – Rit = γ0 + γ1∆Domit + γ2∆Forit + γ3∆R&Dit + γ4∆Intit + γ5∆Divit + γ6∆Debtit  
+ γ7NFit + δit.               (11) 
Where the dependent variable is the excess stock return of firm i during fiscal year t, 
which is calculated as the firm’s return during fiscal year t (rit) less the return of the firm’s 
benchmark portfolio over the same fiscal year (Rit). The benchmark portfolio consists of firms 
that have similar size and book-to-market ratios to firm i and I use the Fama and French 5x5 size 
and book-to-market portfolios formed at the beginning of fiscal year t. For independent variables, 
∆Xit is the realized change of variable X for firm i from fiscal year t-1 to year t. ∆Domit is the 
change of pretax domestic earnings (PIDOM); ∆Forit is the change of pretax foreign earnings 
(PIFO); ∆R&Dit is the change of R&D (XRD) expense; ∆Intit is the change of interest expense 
(XINT); ∆Divit is the change of dividend (DVC); ∆Debtit is the change of debt, which is the sum 
of long-term debt (DLTT) and short-term debt (DLC); NFit is the new financing in fiscal year t, 
which is equal to net new equity issuance (SSTK-PRSTKC) plus net new debt issuance (DLTIS-
DLTR). I scale variables in equation (11) by the average total assets of fiscal year t-1 and fiscal 
year t.28 
                                                           
27
 When examining the relation between stock pricing and accounting earnings, Kraft et al. (2007) suggest 
that it is necessary to include other variables that are value relevant for the stock market and are correlated 
with earnings. Faulkender and Wang (2006) propose an empirical model that controls for firm-specific risk 
factors such as changes in financing policy and investment policy.  
 
28
 The results are similar when I scale equation (11) by lagged market value. I scale equation (11) by the 
same scalar (average assets) as equation (17).  
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In equation (11), I interpret γ1 (γ2) as the excess stock return in response to an additional 
dollar change in domestic earnings (foreign earnings). To the extent that investors price foreign 
earnings higher than domestic earnings (Bodnar and Weintrop 1997), γ2 is expected to be higher 
than γ1 (γ1 < γ2). I next examine how investors price foreign managed earnings relative to 
domestic managed earnings.   
Following Dyreng et al. (2012), I attribute worldwide pretax discretionary accruals to 
domestic and foreign activities based on domestic and foreign pretax earnings. The equation is 
estimated as below, 
DAit = c0 + c1Domit + c2Forit + eit.                                                                            (12) 
Where the dependent variable is pretax discretionary accruals (DAit) for firm i in fiscal 
year t and independent variables are domestic pretax earnings (Domit) and foreign pretax earnings 
(Forit) for firm i in fiscal year t. All variables are scaled by average total assets of fiscal year t-1 
and year t. The coefficient c1 (c2) is the rate at which pretax discretionary accruals are derived 
from domestic (foreign) pretax income in fiscal year t. By estimating equation (12) by fiscal year 
and two-digit SIC codes, I form predicted value of c1 (!"# ) and c2 (!# ) for each year and industry.29 
By multiplying !"#  and !#  with domestic earnings and foreign earnings separately, I have the 
following, 
DA_Domit = !"# ×Domit,                                                                                         (13a) 
DA_Forit = !# ×	Forit.                                                                                             (13b) 
                                                           
29
 For each regression by fiscal year and two-digit SIC codes, I require that there are at least 6 observations.  
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In equation (13a) and (13b), DA_Domit and DA_Forit predict pretax discretionary 
accruals derived from the domestic and foreign sources for firm i in fiscal year t. The 
discretionary accruals decomposition will be used in the market valuation test below.30  
I rewrite equation (11) by decomposing worldwide pretax income into pretax operating 
cash flow, pretax discretionary accruals, pretax nondiscretionary accruals and pretax nonworking 
capital accruals as below,  
rit – Rit = µ0 + µ1∆OCFit + µ2∆NDAit + µ3∆DAit + µ4∆NWCit + µ5∆R&Dit + µ6∆Intit  
 + µ7∆Divit + µ8∆Debtit + µ9NFit + δit.            (14) 
Where OCFit, NDAit, DAit, and NWCit are defined in section 3.1. ∆Xit is the realized 
change of variable X for firm i from fiscal year t-1 to year t. To examine how µ3, the market 
valuation of an additional dollar of pretax discretionary accruals, varies with foreign and domestic 
activities, I substitute equation (13a) and (13b) into equation (12), and rewrite the change of 
discretionary accruals as below: 
DAit - DAi,t-1 = (DA_Domit - DA_Domi,t-1) + (DA_Forit - DA_Fori,t-1) + (eit - ei,t-1) 
          = ∆DA_Domit + ∆DA_Forit + ∆eit.           (15) 
In equation (15), the change of worldwide pretax discretionary accruals (∆DAit) is 
decomposed into change in domestic pretax discretionary accruals (∆DA_Domit), change in 
foreign pretax discretionary accruals (∆DA_Forit) and an unexplained residual term (∆eit). By 
                                                           
30
 In equation (12), the decomposition method based on foreign and domestic pretax income might be 
subject to measurement error. The decomposition method might not capture real foreign and domestic 
discretionary accruals, causing seemingly indifferent valuation between foreign and domestic discretionary 
accruals in equation (17) and confounding the interpretation. I conduct additional tests to address the 
potential measurement error in Table 5.  
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inserting equation (15) back to equation (14) and combining residual terms, I have the 
following,31 
rit – Rit = µ0 + µ1∆OCFit + µ2∆NDAit + µ3(∆DA_Domit + ∆DA_Forit) + µ4∆NWCit  
+ µ5∆R&Dit + µ6∆Intit + µ7∆Divit + µ8∆Debtit + µ9NFit + σit.              (16) 
Where the marginal valuation coefficients of domestic pretax discretionary accruals and 
foreign pretax discretionary accruals are constrained to be the same (µ3). To examine whether 
investors value foreign managed earnings differently from domestic managed earnings, I relax the 
coefficient constraint and allow the marginal valuation to vary with domestic and foreign 
components:  
rit – Rit = µ0 + µ1∆OCFit + µ2∆NDAit + µ31∆DA_Domit + µ32∆DA_Forit + µ4∆NWCit  
+ µ5∆R&Dit + µ6∆Intit + µ7∆Divit + µ8∆Debtit + µ9NFit + σit.             (17) 
In equation (17), I interpret µ31 (µ32) as the marginal valuation of domestic (foreign) 
pretax discretionary accruals. To the extent that investors can detect opportunistic foreign 
earnings management, H2 predicts that investors do not value foreign pretax discretionary 
accruals higher than domestic pretax discretionary accruals, thus µ31 ≥ µ32.32  
  
                                                           
31
 σit in equation (16) consists of (µ3×∆eit + δit). As ∆eit is theoretically orthogonal to ∆DA_Domit and 
∆DA_Forit, the inclusion of ∆eit in the residual term (σit) is unlikely to cause an omitted variable bias. For 
robustness check, I include ∆eit from equation (15) as a separate regressor in section 6.3. 
 
32
 For the purpose of this study, I focus on the valuation of pretax earnings components. However, to the 
extent that managed earnings can predict future cash flow under the private information hypothesis, if firms 
determine not to repatriate foreign managed earnings back to the U.S., foreign managed earnings will be 
subject to lower taxes and predict higher future after-tax cash flow than domestic managed earnings. Thus, 
foreign managed earnings might be valued higher than domestic managed earnings due to the lower tax 
cost. To control for the possible tax difference between foreign managed earnings and domestic managed 
earnings, I test the valuation of after-tax foreign and domestic earnings components in section 6.4.  
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CHAPTER IV 
SAMPLE SELECTION AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
I construct the sample from the Compustat database between fiscal year 1988 and 2011.33 
I exclude firms in the financial industry (6000<=SIC<=6999) and utility industry 
(4900<=SIC<=4999) and keep firms that are incorporated in the U.S. (FIC=USA) and that report 
financial statements in U.S. dollars (CURCD=USD). As some variables in the Compustat should 
not have been coded as missing, I follow Dyreng and Lindsey (2009) to replace missing values of 
foreign current tax expense (TXFO), federal current tax expense (TXFED), pretax foreign income 
(PIFO) and pretax domestic income (PIDOM) as below: 
1) Define worldwide current income tax expense (TXWW) as the difference between total 
income tax expense (TXT) and deferred tax expense (TXDI). 
2) If TXFO is missing and TXFED is equal to TXWW, I replace TXFO by zero. 
3) If TXFO is missing and PIDOM is equal to pretax income (PI), I replace TXFO by 
zero. 
4) If PIFO is missing and PIDOM is equal to PI, I replace PIFO by zero. 
5) If TXFO is missing and TXFED is equal to TXWW, I replace TXFO by zero.  
6) If PIFO is missing and PIDOM and PI are not missing, I replace PIFO by (PI-
PIDOM). 
7) If PIDOM is missing and PIFO and PI are not missing, I replace PIDOM by (PI-
PIFO). 
                                                           
33
 I choose the sample period because the top federal statutory income tax rate is relatively stable in the 
period. Before year 1988, the top statutory tax rate was 40%. Between year 1988 and year 1992, the top 
statutory tax rate was 34%. From year 1993 until now, the top statutory tax rate is 35%.  
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8) If PI is missing and PIFO and PIDOM are not missing, I replace PI by 
(PIFO+PIDOM). 
9) If TXFED is missing and TXFO and TXWW are not missing, I replace TXFED by 
(TXWW-TXFO). 
10) If TXFO is missing and TXWW and TXFED are not missing, I replace TXFO by 
(TXWW-TXFED).  
11) If TXWW is missing and TXFED and TXFO are not missing, I replace TXWW by 
(TXFED + TXFO).  
After setting variables by the steps above, I replace PIFO and TXFO with zero if they are 
still missing; I replace PIDOM and TXFED with (PI-PIFO) and (TXWW-TXFO) if they are still 
missing. I define a firm as a MNC if the firm has non-zero TXFO or non-zero PIFO throughout 
the sample period. In contrast, I define a firm as a domestic company if the firm has zero TXFO 
and zero PIFO throughout the sample period. To measure ETR applicable to pretax earnings 
components, I require firm-years to have positive pretax income (PI > 0).34 After eliminating 
firm-years with missing accounting information, I generate 11,356 multinational firm-years and 
13,736 domestic firm-years. I then merge the multinational subsample with the CRSP stock 
monthly file for stock price information. This generates 6,489 observations after eliminating firm-
years with missing variables necessary for the market valuation regression.  
Table 1Panel A provides descriptive statistics for the MNC sample. The average 
worldwide ETR is 33.9%, which is between domestic ETR (35.2%) and foreign ETR (33.5%). 
Compared to the domestic sample reported in Table 1 Panel B, MNCs on average have lower 
                                                           
34
 Dyreng and Lindsey (2009) include ETR estimates for firm-years with zero or negative pretax income. 
They find that the regression model based on firm-years with zero or negative pretax income has poor 
explanatory power and none of the variables of interest is statistically different from zero.  
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ETR, larger size and more R&D. In untabulated correlation results, the magnitude of 
nondiscretionary accruals (NDA) is positively correlated with worldwide ETR while the degree of 
discretionary accruals (DA) is negatively correlated with worldwide ETR. This is consistent with 
the notion that multinational companies tend to concentrate discretionary accruals in low tax 
countries while accruing nondiscretionary earnings worldwide. Moreover, discretionary accruals 
have a zero correlation with domestic ETR and a negative correlation with foreign ETR, though 
statistically insignificant (p-value=0.29).  
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CHAPTER V 
RESULTS 
Foreign Earnings Management Test 
In this subsection, I empirically test H1—foreign earnings management hypothesis of 
MNCs—based on equation (9). As noted in section 3.1, by subtracting all continuous variables in 
equation (9) by their respective mean, I can interpret the coefficient of discretionary accruals (βb1) 
as the difference between ETR applicable to discretionary accruals and ETR applicable to 
nondiscretionary accruals for a firm-year with average size, debt, advertising and R&D expense 
ratio. To the extent that MNCs concentrate discretionary accruals in low tax foreign countries, the 
ETR on discretionary accruals is expected to be lower than the ETR on nondiscretionary accruals 
(βb1 < 0).  
Table 2 Panel A column (1) reports results from equation (9) based on the multination 
sample. I find that the ETR on discretionary accruals is 4.3% lower than the ETR on 
nondiscretionary accruals (the coefficient of DA is -0.043, p-value=0.001), which means by 
managing earnings in low tax foreign countries, MNCs on average can lower income tax expense 
by $0.043 per dollar of pretax income. In contrast, I expect the ETR on discretionary accruals to 
be similar to the ETR on nondiscretionary accruals for the domestic subsample.35 Consistent with 
the expectation, in column (2), the ETR on discretionary accruals is 0.6 percentage points higher 
than the ETR on nondiscretionary accruals but the difference is not significantly different from 
zero (p-value=0.618). By comparing results between MNC and domestic subsamples, the 
evidence is consistent with the foreign earnings management prediction under H1. Additionally, 
the model has good fitness as the adjusted R-squares are above 70% for both subsamples.   
                                                           
35
 To be consistent with Equation (9), I use the same set of control variables for domestic and MNCs in 
Table 2. In Table 4, I will adjust for the sample difference between MNCs and domestic companies.  
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Theoretically, the coefficients (ETRs) of earnings components are expected to be within 
the boundary of top U.S. statutory tax rates. In column (1), the ETR on working capital accruals 
for MNCs is 37.6%, which is above the 35% top federal statutory income tax rate but below the 
39.5% combined federal and state statutory income tax rate.36 Compared to the 33.2% ETR on 
working capital accruals for domestic companies in column (2), MNCs have 4.4% higher ETR on 
working capital accruals possibly because MNCs operate in more domestic tax jurisdictions than 
domestic companies. Consistent with the prediction, I find that while MNCs on average report 
$0.36 combined domestic tax expense per dollar or pretax earnings, domestic companies on 
average only report $0.23 combined domestic tax expense per dollar of pretax earnings.37 The 
results are not tabulated for brevity.  
Based on MNCs, I estimate equation (9) by each fiscal year and examine the time trend 
distribution of βb1 (the coefficient of DA). As Figure 1 shows, though the U.S. corporate tax rate 
is relatively constant across the sample period, most foreign countries have been gradually cutting 
taxes and the U.S. becomes one of the highest tax countries by the end of the sample period. The 
relative decrease of foreign taxes brings more opportunities for foreign earnings management 
over time. Thus, I expect the ETR difference between discretionary and nondiscretionary accruals 
becomes more prominent in the latter sample period than the early sample period.  
In Figure 2, I plot the time distribution of βb1 and I find significant foreign earnings 
management evidence over time. 
 
The yearly ETR difference between discretionary and 
nondiscretionary accruals is not significant in the early sample period (except for year 1990) 
when the U.S. tax is not relatively high compared to other countries. However, post year 2002, all 
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 The combined U.S. corporate income tax rate is available from http://www.oecd.org/tax/tax-
policy/oecdtaxdatabase.htm.  
 
37
 The combined domestic tax expense includes taxes at both federal and state levels. Though state taxes 
give more direct evidence on domestic tax jurisdictions, I find some MNCs combine state taxes into federal 
taxes and report state taxes as missing. Due the measurement issue of state taxes, I use the combined 
domestic tax expense for analysis.  
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yearly ETRs on discretionary accruals are significantly lower than the yearly ETRs on 
nondiscretionary accruals (p-value is below 0.01), except for year 2009, suggesting increasing 
foreign earnings management coincide with the time trend of decreasing foreign taxes.   
In Table 3, I identify a subsample of domestic firms that become MNCs during the 
sample period. Associated with the foreign expansion, firms are able to manage earnings in low 
tax countries. Empirically, I predict that before the foreign expansion, the ETR on discretionary 
accruals is similar to the ETR on nondiscretionary, and due to the foreign expansion, the ETR on 
discretionary accruals will be lower than the ETR on nondiscretionary accruals. The results in 
column (1) Table 3 are consistent with the prediction. The ETR on discretionary accruals is not 
significantly different from the ETR on nondiscretionary accruals before foreign expansion (the 
coefficient of DA is -0.015, p-value=0.320). Associated with foreign expansion, The ETR on 
discretionary accruals is 3.9 percentage points lower than the ETR on nondiscretionary accruals.  
The column (1) of Table 3 is based on an OLS regression, but foreign expansion is likely 
an endogenous decision of firm financial conditions. In column (2) and (3), I address the 
endogeneity issue by predicting the MNC sample self-selection. Following Dastidar (2009), I 
model the decision to expand internationally as a function of lagged capital expenditure (Cap), 
lagged return on assets (ROA), lagged firms size, lagged total debt and industry fixed effect. 
International business literature suggests that companies expand to foreign markets as the 
marginal return on assets at home markets declines and large size companies are more likely to 
succeed because of their cost minimization through economics of scale (Caves 1996). The net 
benefits of foreign expansion decrease with transaction cost. The transaction cost of international 
expansion is likely high for companies that are financially constrained because the cost of raising 
additional capital might increase, and for companies that rely more on tangible properties such as 
capital investments (Dastidar 2009).  
31 
 
Similar to the prediction, in column (2) of Table 3, I find firms with lower ROA, larger 
size and more capital investments are more likely to expand internationally. The first stage Probit 
regression generates predicted probabilities of foreign expansion for each firm-year that will be 
used in the second stage ETR estimates reported in column (3). By interacting the predicted 
foreign expansion probabilities with pretax earnings components, I find consistent results as 
column (1). While the ETR on discretionary accruals is not significantly different from the ETR 
on nondiscretionary accrual before foreign expansion (the coefficient of DA is 0.028, p-
value=0.432), as the probability of foreign expansion increases by 1%, the ETR on discretionary 
accruals becomes 0.13 percentage points lower than the ETR on nondiscretionary accruals.  
In Table 4, I use a different approach to examine the foreign earnings management of 
MNCs. By substituting the dependent variable (TXT) in equation (9) by foreign income tax 
expense (For TXT), I predict that to the extent that foreign discretionary accruals are 
opportunistically concentrated in low tax countries, the foreign ETR on discretionary accruals is 
lower than the foreign ETR on nondiscretionary accruals. I test the prediction in column (1) and 
the coefficient of DA is -0.031 (p-value=0.017), indicating that the foreign ETR on discretionary 
accruals is 3.1% lower than the foreign ETR on nondiscretionary accruals. While MNCs can use 
low tax foreign subsidiaries to lower foreign income tax expense on managed earnings, MNCs 
are less likely to lower domestic income tax expense on domestic managed earnings. I expect the 
domestic ETR on discretionary accruals to be similar to the domestic ETR on nondiscretionary 
accruals. By substituting the dependent variable (TXT) in equation (9) by domestic income tax 
expense (Dom TXT), I find that the domestic ETR on discretionary accruals is not significantly 
different from the domestic ETR on nondiscretionary accruals (p-value=0.904). 
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Market Valuation for Foreign Earnings Management 
Table 5 reports market valuation results based on the market valuation equations 
developed in section 3.3. In column (1), I examine the market valuation of foreign and domestic 
pretax earnings based on equation (11). Similar to previous evidence (Bodnar and Weintrop 1997; 
Collins et al. 1998; Christophe 2002), I predict and find that foreign earnings are on average 
valued higher than domestic earnings. While one dollar increase of domestic pretax earnings is 
valued at $1.392, one dollar increase of foreign pretax earnings is valued at $2.204. The valuation 
difference $0.812 is significant at the 5% level according to the F-test results in Panel B (p-
value=0.014). Column (2) reports the market valuation of foreign versus domestic pretax 
managed earnings based on equation (17). To the extent that investors can detect foreign earnings 
management, I predict and find that foreign managed earnings are not valued higher than 
domestic managed earnings. While one dollar increase in predicted pretax foreign discretionary 
accruals is valued at $1.245, one dollar increase in predicted pretax domestic discretionary 
accruals is valued at $1.446. The marginal valuation difference $0.201 is not statistically 
significant (p-value=0.801).  
However, the similar valuation between foreign and domestic discretionary accruals 
could be due to the failure of differentiating real foreign and domestic discretionary accruals. As a 
robustness check to the worldwide discretionary accrual decomposition model equation (12), 
panel C of Table 5 reports ETR applicable to estimated foreign and domestic discretionary 
accruals. Using a regression framework similar to equation (9), I regress worldwide total tax 
expense (TXT) on decomposed worldwide discretionary accruals by domestic component 
(DA_Dom), foreign component (DA_For) and residual component (e). I predict and find that the 
ETR applicable to domestic discretionary accruals is significantly lower than the ETR applicable 
to foreign discretionary accruals. The ETR estimates support the decomposition of worldwide 
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discretionary accruals in equation (12) and thus the results of column (2) are unlikely due to 
measurement error.  
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CHAPTER VI 
ROBUSTNESS CHECK 
Earnings Management Settings 
In Table 6, I separately examine foreign earnings management evidence in three types of 
settings. In the first case, I consider the setting in which earnings might be managed to avoid 
small losses. By comparing firm-years with a slight earnings increase to firm-years with a slight 
earnings decrease in column (1), I predict that firm-years with a slight earnings increase are more 
likely to manage earnings in foreign countries.38 The coefficient of EM×DA is -0.016 (p-
value=0.540), indicating the small earnings increase is associated with lower ETR on 
discretionary accruals than nondiscretionary accruals, but the difference is not significant at the 
10% level. Secondly, I examine the setting in which earnings might be managed to meet or beat 
analysts’ forecasts. By comparing the firm-years that just meet or beat analysts’ forecasts to the 
firm-years that just miss analysts’ forecasts in column (2), I predict that the firm-years that just 
meet or beat analysts’ forecasts are more likely to manage earnings in foreign countries, but I do 
not find significant evidence to support the prediction (the coefficient of EM×DA is -0.012. p-
value=0.731).39  
The lack of significant foreign earnings management evidence in column (1) and (2) is 
probably due to the data limitation, which tests the discretionary accruals at the foreign subsidiary 
level with incentives at the top consolidated level. For example, prior research (Healy 1985; 
Gaver et al. 1995) often finds mixed evidence when examining the relation between top level 
                                                           
38
 For the subsample test of small earnings increase, I set the change of earnings cutoffs between -0.02 and 
0.02. The results are similar when I choose the cutoffs between -0.01 and 0.01.  
 
39
 For the subsample test of meeting or beating earnings forecasts, I calculate earnings expectation as the 
median EPS forecasted by analysts in the month of earnings announcements. The results are similar when I 
calculate earnings expectation as the median EPS forecasted by analysts in three months before earnings 
announcements. 
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bonus plans and managers’ discretionary accrual decisions. Bernard and Skinner (1996) attribute 
the issue in part to the limitation of data. Guidry et al. (1998) enhance the power of tests by using 
bonus plans and discretionary accruals from business-unit level. In this study, if the top 
management, facing the equity market’s expectation, set earnings targets for subsidiaries, foreign 
subsidiary level managers subsequently make discretionary accrual decisions to meet these 
targets. The anecdotal evidence from Appendix B seems to support the conjecture. Thus, the 
power of tests would be enhanced if the earnings management incentives could be directly 
measured at the foreign subsidiary level.  
In the third case, I sort firm-years with positive discretionary accruals (income increasing 
earnings management) in fiscal year t into quartiles and designate firm-years in the top quartile as 
more likely to manage earnings than firm-years in the bottom quartile.40 In column (3), for firm-
years in the top discretionary accrual quartile, the ETR on discretionary accruals is 13.2% lower 
than the ETR on nondiscretionary accruals (p-value=0.008). In contrast, for firms-years in the 
bottom discretionary accrual quartile reported in column (4), the ETR on discretionary accruals is 
not significantly different from the ETR on nondiscretionary accruals (p-value=0.944). The 
evidence in column (3) and (4) suggests that MNCs that have more income increasing 
discretionary accruals are more likely to manage earnings in foreign countries.  
The evidence above shows firm-years in the top discretionary accruals quartile are more 
likely to manage foreign earnings compared to firm-years in the bottom discretionary accruals 
quartile. As more foreign earnings management is associated with lower foreign ETR, I predict 
the top DA quartile will on average have lower foreign ETR (For ETR) than the bottom DA 
quartile. Panel B of Table 6 shows the average For ETR for the top DA quartile is 2.3 percentage 
points lower than the bottom DA quartile at a 1% significance level. In contrast, the domestic 
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 I also require discretionary accruals in fiscal year t-1 to be positive to avoid the negative discretionary 
accruals in fiscal year t-1 reversed into positive discretionary accruals in fiscal year t.  
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ETR (Dom ETR) for the top DA quartile is higher than the bottom DA quartile, likely due to the 
firms in the top quartile operating in more domestic tax jurisdictions. The results corroborate the 
foreign earnings management finding of column (3).  
Performance Matched Discretionary Accruals 
In this subsection, I reexamine the empirical models in Table 2 and Table 5 using 
performance matched discretionary accruals (DA_per). To calculate DA_per, for each firm-year, I 
match it by a decile of firm-years with similar current pretax return on assets, same first two-digit 
SIC code and same MNC/domestic type. I next subtract the discretionary accruals for a firm-year 
calculated from equation (10) by the median discretionary accruals of a matched declie. The 
performance matching procedure is similar to Francis et al. (2005) and Frank et al. (2009). To 
calculate foreign and domestic performance matched discretionary accruals, I replace the 
dependent variable in equation (12) by DA_per.  
Based on the performance matched discretionary accruals, Table 7 has similar results to 
Table 2. In column (1), the coefficient of DA_per is -0.025, indicating that the ETR on 
discretionary accruals is 2.5% lower than the ETR on nondiscretionary accruals for MNCs (p-
value=0.028). In contrast, for domestic companies in column (2), the coefficient of DA_per is not 
significant. Table 8 examines the market valuation of performance matched foreign discretionary 
accruals (DA_For_per) and domestic discretionary accruals (DA_Dom_per). The results in Table 
8 are similar to Table 5. The marginal valuation of DA_For_per is not significantly different from 
the marginal valuation of DA_Dom_per (p-value=0.916). The evidence shows that the main 
results are not sensitive to growth performance matching.  
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Residual Discretionary Accruals 
In this section, I add the change of residual discretionary accruals (∆eit) from equation 
(15) to equation (17). In previous tests, I omit ∆eit from the market valuation regression because 
∆eit is theoretically orthogonal to the change in domestic discretionary accruals (∆DA_Dom) and 
the change in foreign discretionary accruals (∆DA_For). With ∆eit as an additional regressor, the 
results in Table 9 are consistent with the results in Table 5. The marginal valuation of foreign 
discretionary accruals is not significantly different from the marginal valuation of domestic 
discretionary accruals (the p-value of F-test is 0.652). Moreover, the coefficient magnitude of 
∆DA_For and ∆DA_Dom is also similar to Table 5. Thus, the results in Table 5 are robust to the 
inclusion of residual discretionary accruals. 
After-tax Market Valuation Test 
In section 3.3, I examine the market valuation of pretax earnings components. However, I 
note that under the private information hypothesis of earnings management, to the extent that 
managed earnings can predict future cash flow, foreign managed earnings might predict higher 
future after-tax cash flow than domestic managed earnings because foreign managed earnings are 
subject to lower tax rates. In this case, foreign pretax managed earnings could be valued higher 
than domestic pretax managed earnings. Though the empirical evidence thus far does not support 
the private information hypothesis, I attempt to control for possible different tax cost on foreign 
and domestic managed earnings by using after-tax earnings valuation. Empirically, I replace 
pretax earnings components in equation (17) by after-tax earnings components. Similar to the 
results of pretax earnings valuation in Table 5 column (1), I find that in Table 10 column (1), 
after-tax foreign earnings are valued significantly higher than after-tax domestic earnings at the 1% 
level (the F-test shows p-value of 0.003). This suggests that the foreign earnings valuation 
premium is not due to lower foreign tax cost. In column (2), the marginal valuation of foreign 
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after-tax managed earnings is not significantly different from the marginal valuation of domestic 
after-tax managed earnings (p-value=0.991). This indicates that after controlling for tax cost, 
foreign managed earnings are still valued similar to domestic managed earnings, which is 
consistent with the opportunistic earnings management hypothesis.  
Weighted Statutory Tax Rate 
Empirical Design 
Using equation (9) developed in section 3.1, I compare the ETR on discretionary accruals 
to the ETR on nondiscretionary accruals. In this section, I use a different tax measure—weighted 
statutory tax rate (WSTR)—to test foreign earnings management prediction. The rational is the 
same as the previous test: to the extent that MNCs concentrate earnings management in low tax 
foreign countries and carry out operating activities worldwide, managed earnings are on average 
subject to a lower corporate income tax rate than unmanaged earnings. 
Under the SEC Regulation S-X Rule 4-08(h), companies are required to provide income 
tax rate reconciliation schedules in their financial statements. A typical reconciliation schedule 
starts from the hypothetical income tax expense that would result from the federal statutory tax 
rate applied to pretax financial income, adjusted by reconciliation items, and eventually reaches 
total income tax expense in the income statement. Common reconciliation items include: state 
and local taxes, foreign statutory tax rate differences, permanent book-tax differences, and tax 
credits (Hanlon, 2003).41 For the purpose of my study, the reconciliation is illustrated as below: 
TXTit = WSTRit×PIit + ADJit.             (18) 
                                                           
41
 See the Appendix A for examples of income tax reconciliation schedule. Permanent book-tax differences 
exist when the difference between book and taxable income will not reverse over time.  
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Where TXTit is total book income tax expense for a firm i in year t; WSTRit is the 
weighted average of federal, state, local and foreign statutory tax rates for a firm i in year t; PIit is 
pretax income before minority interests; WSTRit × PIit is the hypothetical income tax expense 
that would result weighted average of federal, state, local and foreign statutory tax rates applied 
to pretax income; ADJit is adjustments required to reconcile the hypothetical income tax expense 
to the total income tax expense in income statement, which is expressed as a function of variables 
that capture tax credits and permanent book-tax differences as below: 
ADJit = d0 + d1R&Dit + d2ADit+ d3Int Revit + d4Amortit + d5Stock Compit  
+ d6Net Divit + d7Net Investit + d8Manufactureit + d9MIit+ eit,        (19) 
where: 
R&Dit = research and development expense (XRD) for firm i in fiscal year t. I control for R&D 
expenditure to capture R&D tax credits that reduce tax payments; 
ADit = advertising expense (XAD) for firm i in fiscal year t. The variable is used to proxy for 
meal and entertainment expense nondeductible for tax purpose;  
Int Revit = interest income (IDIT) for firm i in fiscal year t. The variable is used to proxy for tax-
exempt interests from municipal and local bonds;  
Amortit = amortization of intangibles (AM) for firm i in fiscal year t. The variable is used to 
proxy for intangible property amortization such as goodwill that is not deductible for tax purpose;  
Stock Compit = stock compensation expense (STKCO) for firm i in fiscal year t. The variable is 
used to proxy for stock compensation expense nondeductible for tax purpose;42 
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 For variables XRD, XAD, and STKCO, I replace them as zero if a firm-year has missing value.  
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Net Divit = net dividend cash flow (DV) for firm i in fiscal year t. The variable is used to proxy 
for dividend received deduction for tax purpose;43  
Net Investit = net cash flow from investing activities (IVNCF) for firm i in fiscal year t. The 
variable is used to proxy for the tax exempt net insurance proceeds from life insurance policies 
for key officers;  
Manufactureit = one if a firm i in fiscal year t is in manufacturing industry (SIC between 2011 and 
3999).44 The variable is used to proxy for domestic manufacturing deduction tax credit. 45 
MIit = minority interests (MII) for firm i in fiscal year t. The variable is used to capture equity 
interests in less than one hundred percent owned entities that might create book and tax 
consolidation differences.  
In equation (19), except for R&Dit, Manufactureit and MIit, I include other variables to 
control for permanent book tax differences.46 I substitute equation (19) into equation (18) and 
rearrange terms. This generates the following:  
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 For dividend cash flow (DV), I replace it as zero if it is negative to capture dividend received instead of 
dividend paid.  
 
44
 The manufacturing industry is defined according to the NBER classification 
(http://www.nber.org/nberces/). 
 
45
 U.S. domestic companies with “qualified production activities” (generally speaking manufacturing 
activities in the U.S.) can take a tax deduction of 3% from net income. 
 
46
 Though it is not the purpose of this study to review tax rules that create taxable income difference from 
book income, I briefly explain how variables in equation (19) can create permanent book-tax differences as 
below. See Hanlon (2003) for more detailed discussions. 1) ADit. Certain meal and entertainment expense 
for amusement or recreation purpose is subject to 50% deductible limitation for tax purpose while they are 
recognized as expense for financial reporting; 2) Int Revit. Local and municipal government interest income 
is not taxable but is recognized as interest income for financial reporting; 3) Amortit. When a buyer 
company acquires a seller company’s stock, the buyer company recognizes goodwill based on purchase 
premiums for financial reporting, which is subject to future amortization or impairment. However, the 
goodwill based on stock acquisition cannot be amortized for tax purpose; 4) Stock Compit. For the 
incentive stock option (ISO) compensation, while it is recognized as compensation expense post FAS 123, 
it is not deductible for tax purpose. 5) Net Divit. As a company receives dividends from investments in 
other domestic companies, the company can claim dividend received deduction for tax purpose to avoid 
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TXTit = φ0 + φ1PIit + φ2R&Dit + φ3ADit+ φ4Int Revit + φ5Amortit + φ6Stock Compit  
+ φ7Net Divit + φ8Net Investit + φ9Manufactureit + φ10MIit + uit.         (20) 
The coefficient φ1 is interpreted as the weighted statutory tax rate (WSTR) applicable to 
pretax income. I decompose pretax income (PIit) of equation (20) into four earnings components 
as below: 
TXTit = φ0 + φ11OCFit + φ12DAit + φ13NDAit + φ14NWCit + φ2R&Dit + φ3ADit 
+ φ4Int Revit + φ5Amortit + φ6Stock Compit + φ7Net Divit + φ8Net Investit  
+φ9 Manufactureit + φ10MIit + uit,            (21) 
The earnings components are defined the same as section 3.1. To the extent that MNCs 
concentrate managed earnings in foreign countries while conducting operation worldwide (H1), I 
expect the WSTR on DAit to be lower than the WSTR on NDAit (φ12 < φ13). To directly test the 
significance of the coefficient difference between discretionary and nondiscretionary accruals, I 
substitute working capital accruals (WCit) for nondiscretionary accruals (NDAit) in equation (21). 
After rearranging terms, I generate a mathematically equivalent expression of equation (21) as 
below: 
TXTit = ω0 + ω11OCFit + ω12WCit + ω13DAit + ω14NWCit + ω2R&Dit + ω3ADit 
+ ω4Int Revit + ω5Amortit + ω6Stock Compit + ω7Net Divit  
+ ω8Net Investit + ω9Manufactureit + ω10MIit + uit.                 (22) 
                                                                                                                                                                             
multiple tax. For financial reporting, the company recognizes dividend received as investment income. 6) 
Net Investit. Life insurance proceeds or premiums for key officers of companies are not taxable or 
deductible but they are recognized for financial reporting.  
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The coefficient on DAit (ω13) is now the difference between WSTR applicable to 
discretionary accruals and WSTR applicable to nondiscretionary accruals. Under H1, I predict 
that ω13 < 0. There are two benefits of using equation (22) in empirical estimation. First, it can 
directly test the coefficient difference between discretionary and nondiscretionary accruals. 
Second, the standard errors of the coefficient difference can be corrected for both time serial and 
cross-sectional correlations, as I estimate equation (22) based on standard errors clustered at both 
firm and fiscal year level. 
Empirical Results 
In Table 11, for the MNC subsample reported in column (1), the WSTR on discretionary 
accruals is 4% lower than the WSTR on nondiscretionary accruals (p-value=0.005). In contrast, 
for the domestic subsample reported in column (2), the WSTR on discretionary accruals is not 
significantly different from the WSTR on nondiscretionary accruals (p-value=0.378). 
Additionally, the WSTR on working capital accruals for MNCs is 35.9%, which is 3.7% higher 
than the WSTR on working capital accruals for domestic companies. This is consistent with my 
prediction that MNCs operate in more domestic tax jurisdictions than domestic companies.   
Table 12 examines the subsample of firms that become MNCs during the sample period. 
As firms become MNCs, the incremental WSTR on discretionary accruals is 6.2% lower than the 
incremental WSTR on nondiscretionary accruals. Similar to Table 3, the evidence suggests that 
foreign expansion brings MNCs opportunities for foreign earnings management. Additionally, the 
WSTR of working capital accruals increases by 5.3% with foreign expansion. This supports my 
prediction that early foreign expansion is accompanied with continuing domestic expansion.  
Table 13 illustrates foreign and domestic WSTR of MNCs separately in column (1) and 
(2). Consistent with Table 4, I find that the foreign WSTR on discretionary accruals is 6.1% 
lower than the foreign WSTR on nondiscretionary accruals in column (1) (p-value=0.034). In 
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contrast, the domestic WSTR on discretionary accruals is not significantly different from the 
domestic WSTR on nondiscretionary accruals (p-value=0.622). In summary, the evidence on 
foreign earnings management is robust to different tax rate measures.  
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CHAPTER VII 
CONCLUSION 
This study examines the role of taxes for U.S. MNCs to manage accounting earnings in 
foreign subsidiaries. Relying on worldwide consolidated financial statements, I predict to the 
extent that MNCs concentrate earnings management in low tax countries, discretionary accruals 
are subject to lower income tax rates than nondiscretionary accruals. Consistent with the 
prediction, I find that the ETR on discretionary accruals is on average 4.3% lower than the ETR 
on nondiscretionary accruals. Moreover, the trend of foreign earnings management increases over 
time as foreign taxes decrease. Additionally, the foreign ETR on discretionary accruals is 3.1% 
lower than the foreign ETR on nondiscretionary accruals. For firms that become MNCs during 
the sample period, I find foreign expansion is associated with foreign earnings management 
opportunities..  
Having established the foreign earnings management evidence of MNCs based on a large 
sample, I fail to find significant support for the prediction in two possible earnings management 
settings: avoiding small earnings declines and avoiding missing analysts’ forecasts, which is 
likely due to the data limitation that identifies the subsidiary level earnings management with top 
level incentives. However, I find significant foreign earnings management evidence when 
managers likely use large income increasing discretionary accruals to manage earnings upward.   
I also provide evidence on the equity valuation of foreign earnings management. While 
prior studies consistently show that foreign earnings on average are valued higher than domestic 
earnings, I predict and find that the marginal valuation of opportunistically managed foreign 
earnings is not significantly different from the marginal valuation of opportunistically managed 
domestic earnings. The evidence is robust to different specifications.   
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APPENDIX A 
 
DEFINITION OF VARIABLES 
 
Variable Name Description 
  Panel A: Earnings Management Measures 
TXT
 
Total book 
income expense 
Total book income tax expense (TXT) divided by the average total 
assets (AT) of fiscal year t-1 and fiscal year t. 
ETR Total effective 
tax rate 
Total book income tax expense (TXT) divided by the pretax book 
income.  
OCF Pretax 
operating cash 
flow 
Cash flow from operation (OANCF) plus cash tax paid (TXPD) 
and less extraordinary items (XIDOC) divided by the average total 
assets (AT) of fiscal year t-1 and fiscal year t. 
WC Pretax working 
capital accruals 
The change in accounts receivable (RECCH) plus the change in 
inventory (INVCH) and other assets (AOLOCH) minus the change 
in accounts payable (APALCH) divided by the average total assets 
(AT) of fiscal year t-1 and fiscal year t. 
DA Pretax 
discretionary 
accruals 
The residual term from Dechow and Dichev (2002) discretionary 
accrual model. The model is estimated separately by 
MNC/Domestic and two-digit SIC codes and each regression 
requires at least 10 observations. 
NDA Pretax 
nondiscretionar
y accruals 
Working capital accruals (WC) subtracted by discretionary 
accruals (DA). 
NWC Nonworking 
capital accruals 
Pretax income subtracted by pretax operating cash flow and 
working capital accruals. 
NOL Net operating 
loss carry 
forward 
Dummy variable that takes a value of one if a firm-year has net 
operating loss carry forward (TLCF) at the beginning of fiscal year 
t. 
Size Firm size Natural logarithm of total assets (AT). 
Debt Total debt The sum of short-term (DLC) and long-term debt (DLTT) divided 
by the average total assets (AT) of fiscal year t-1 and fiscal year t. 
If DLC and DLTT are both missing, DLC and DLTT are replaced 
with zero.  
R&D Research and 
development 
expense 
Research and development expense (XRD) divided by the average 
total assets (AT) of fiscal year t-1 and fiscal year t. If XRD is 
missing, the variable is replaced with zero.  
AD Advertising 
expense 
Advertising expense (XAD) divided by the average total assets 
(AT) of fiscal year t-1 and fiscal year t. If XAD is missing, the 
variable is replaced with zero. 
For TXT Foreign total 
tax expense 
The sum of foreign current tax expense (TXFO) and foreign 
deferred tax expense (TXDFO) divided by the average total assets 
(AT) of fiscal year t-1 and fiscal year t. 
Dom TXT Domestic total 
tax expense 
The sum of federal current income tax expense (TXFED) and 
federal deferred income tax expense (TXDFO) divided by the 
average total assets (AT) of fiscal year t-1 and fiscal year t. State 
current income tax expense (TXS) is added to federal current 
income tax expense (TXFED) if TXS is available. State deferred 
income tax expense (TXDS) is added to federal deferred income 
tax expense (TXDFO) if TXDS is available 
For ETR Foreign 
effective tax 
rate 
The sum of foreign current income tax expense (TXFED) and 
federal deferred income tax expense (TXDFO) divided by the 
pretax foreign income (PIFO) in fiscal year t.  
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Dom ETR Domestic 
effective tax 
rate 
The sum of federal current income tax expense (TXFED) and 
federal deferred income tax expense (TXDFO) divided by the 
pretax domestic income (PIDOM) in fiscal year t. 
   
AR Abnormal 
return 
The excess stock market return of firm i in fiscal year t, minus the 
benchmark return of Fama and French (1993) 25 size and book-to-
market portfolios formed in the beginning of fiscal year t. 
∆Dom Change of 
pretax domestic 
earnings 
The change of pretax domestic earnings (PIDOM) from fiscal year 
t-1 to fiscal year t divided by the average total assets (AT) of fiscal 
year t-1 and fiscal year t. 
∆For Change of 
pretax foreign 
earnings 
The change of pretax foreign earnings (PIFO) from fiscal year t-1 
to fiscal year t divided by the average total assets (AT) of fiscal 
year t-1 and fiscal year t. 
∆OCF Change of 
pretax operating 
cash flow 
The change of pretax operating cash flow from fiscal year t-1 to 
fiscal year t divided by the average total assets (AT) of fiscal year 
t-1 and fiscal year t. 
∆NDA Change of 
nondiscretionar
y accruals 
The change of pretax nondiscretionary accruals from fiscal year t-1 
to fiscal year t divided by the average total assets (AT) of fiscal 
year t-1 and fiscal year t. 
∆NWC Change of 
nonworking 
capital accruals 
The change of pretax nonworking capital accruals from fiscal year 
t-1 to fiscal year t divided by the average total assets (AT) of fiscal 
year t-1 and fiscal year t. 
∆DA_Dom Change of 
domestic 
discretionary 
accruals 
The change of domestic discretionary accruals divided by the 
average total assets (AT) of fiscal year t-1 and fiscal year t. The 
domestic discretionary accruals are estimated from equation (12) 
and (13a) by year and two-digit SIC code. 
∆DA_For Change of 
foreign 
discretionary 
accruals 
The change of foreign discretionary accruals divided by the 
average total assets (AT) of fiscal year t-1 and fiscal year t. The 
foreign discretionary accruals are estimated from equation (12) 
and (13a) by year and two-digit SIC code. 
∆Int Change of 
interest expense 
The change of interests expense (XINT) divided by the average 
total assets (AT) of fiscal year t-1 and fiscal year t. If XINT is 
missing, the variable is replaced with zero.  
∆Div Change of 
dividends 
The change of dividends (DVC) divided by the average total assets 
(AT) of fiscal year t-1 and fiscal year t. If DVC is missing, the 
variable is replaced with zero. 
∆Debt Change of debt The change of total leverage, the sum of short-term (DLC) and 
long-term debt (DLTT), divided by the average total assets (AT) of 
fiscal year t-1 and fiscal year t. 
NF New financing The sum of new equity issues (SSTK - PRSTKC) + net new debt 
issues (DLTIS - DLTR) divided by the average total assets (AT) of 
fiscal year t-1 and fiscal year t. If NF is missing, the variable is 
replaced with zero. 
   
  Panel C: Additional tests measures 
Cap Capital 
expenditure 
Capital expenditure (CAPXV) divided by the average total assets 
(AT) of fiscal year t-1 and fiscal year t. 
ROA Return on assets Operating Income Before Depreciation (OIBDP) divided by the 
average total assets (AT) of fiscal year t-1 and fiscal year t. 
DA_per Performance 
adjusted 
discretionary 
accruals 
For each firm-year, I match it by a decile of firm-years with 
similar current pretax return on assets (IB/average total assets), 
same first two-digit SIC code and same MNC/domestic type. I 
subtract the discretionary accruals of a firm-year by the median 
discretionary accruals of the matched declie by performance, 
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industry and MNC type.  
DA_Dom_per Performance 
adjusted domestic 
discretionary 
accruals 
Estimate the domestic component of worldwide performance 
adjusted discretionary accruals based on equation (12).  
DA_For_per Performance 
adjusted foreign 
discretionary 
accruals 
Estimate the foreign component of worldwide performance 
adjusted discretionary accruals based on equation (12). 
Dom_after_tax After tax 
domestic 
earnings 
Domestic pretax earnings (PIDOM) subtracted by federal current 
income tax expense (TXFED) and federal deferred income tax 
expense (TXDFED). Both TXFED and TXDFED include state 
current income tax expense (TXS) and state deferred income tax 
expense (TXDS) if they are available. 
For_after_tax After tax 
foreign earnings 
Foreign pretax earnings (PIFO) subtracted by foreign current 
income tax expense (TXFO) and foreign deferred income tax 
expense (TXDFO). 
OCF_after_tax After tax 
operating cash 
flow 
Operating cash flow (OANCF) subtracted by extraordinary items 
(XIDOC). 
NDA_after_tax After tax 
nondiscretionary 
accruals 
Estimated from equation (10), in which the dependent variable is 
after-tax working capital accruals, computed as the change in 
accounts receivable (RECCH), plus the change in inventory 
(INVCH) and other assets (AOLOCH), subtracted by the change 
in accounts payable (APALCH) and tax payable (TXACH). 
DA_Dom_after_t
ax 
After tax 
domestic 
discretionary 
accruals 
Estimated from equation (12) and (13a). I replace the dependent 
variable in equation (12) by after-tax discretionary accruals. 
DA_For_after_ta
x 
After tax foreign 
discretionary 
accruals 
Estimated from equation (12) and (13b). I replace the dependent 
variable in equation (12) by after-tax discretionary accruals. 
NWC_after_tax After tax non-
working capital 
accruals 
After-tax income (IBC) subtracted by after-tax operating cash flow 
and after-tax working capital accruals. 
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APPENDIX B 
 
A CASE OF FOREIGN EARNINGS MANAGEMENT 
 
SYMBOL TECHNOLOGIES INC 
 
Fiscal year 1998 10-K: The Company's sales organization includes domestic sales offices 
located throughout the United States and foreign sales offices in Australia, Austria, Belgium, 
Canada, China, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Mexico, the 
Netherlands, Singapore, South Africa, South Korea, Spain, Sweden and the United 
Kingdom… Foreign sales have represented a substantial portion of the Company's net revenues.  
In 1998, foreign sales accounted for approximately 45 percent of net revenue… Such sales are 
subject to the normal risks of foreign operations, such as: Long receivable collection periods… 
 
Fiscal year 1999 10-K: (same as above)…Foreign sales have represented a substantial portion of 
the Company's net revenues.  In 1999, foreign sales accounted for approximately 42.4 percent of 
net revenue …  
 
SEC Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Release No. 2029 / June 3, 2004: The SEC's 
complaint alleges that from at least 1998 until early 2003, Symbol and the other defendants 
engaged in numerous fraudulent accounting practices and other misconduct…(the SEC’s 
complaint) alleges that Symbol and other defendants engaged in a fraudulent scheme to inflate 
revenue, earnings and other measures of financial performance in order to create the false 
appearance that Symbol had met or exceeded its financial projections… defendants used the 
following fraudulent schemes… (c) channel stuffing and other revenue recognition schemes, 
involving both product sales and customer services; and (d) the manipulation of inventory 
levels and accounts receivable data to conceal the adverse side effects of the revenue 
recognition schemes… 
 
Fiscal year 2002 10-K/A (amended 10-K):  
 
“Previously, each (foreign) regional office was responsible for its financial controls and processes, 
with the business manager in each regional office acting relatively autonomously from Symbol's 
headquarters. Now, our foreign regional offices, with the head of finance for each country, or 
groups of countries, report directly to the finance department in Symbol's headquarters and 
ultimately to the Chief Financial Officer.”  
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APPENDIX C 
 
EXAMPLES OF INCOME TAX RATE RECONCILIATION 
 
Panel A: Cisco Systems, Inc.  
Note to Consolidated Financial Statements of Fiscal Year 2003 
 
Years Ended July 26, 2003 July 27, 2002 July 28, 2001 
Federal statutory rate 35.0% 35.0% (35.0)% 
Effect of: 
 
  
State taxes 1.8 1.8 (2.4) 
Export sales benefits (0.2) (1.5) (1.8) 
Foreign income at other than US 
rates 
(8.9) (4.9) (1.7) 
Nondeductible in-process R&D - 0.9 30.3 
Nondeductible goodwill - - 20.9 
Nondeductible deferred stock-
based compensation 
0.8 1.9 8.0 
Tax-exempt interest - - (1.0) 
Tax credits - (3.4) (2.5) 
Other, net 0.1 0.3 1.2 
Total 28.6% 30.1% 16.0% 
 
 
 
Panel B: Altria Group, Inc.47 
Note to Consolidated Financial Statements of Fiscal Year 2002 
 
Years Ended 2002 2001 2000 
U.S. federal statutory rate 35.0% 35.0% (35.0)% 
Increase (decrease) resulting from: 
 
  
State and local income taxes, net of federal tax 
benefit 
1.7 2.3 2.6 
Goodwill amortization - 2.3 1.3 
Other (including foreign rate differences) (1.2) (1.7) (0.2) 
Effective tax rate 35.5% 37.9% 38.7% 
 
  
                                                           
47
 Altria Group, Inc. is the parent company of Kraft Foods Inc. (“Kraft”) and Miller Brewing Company 
(“Miller”). Altria Group, Inc. is formerly known as Philip Morris Companies Inc. 
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APPENDIX D 
 
TABLES AND FIGURES  
 
Figure 1. Corporate Income Tax Rate by the U.S. and Non-U.S. OECD Countries 
between Year 1981 and Year 2009 
 
 
Source: The corporate income tax distribution is compiled by The Tax Foundation based on IMF and 
OECD tax data.48 According to the OECD definition, corporate income tax rate is a combination of top 
statutory tax rate of central and sub-central governments. Compared to the simple average tax rate of Non-
U.S. OECD countries, the weighted average tax rate of Non-U.S. OECD countries is adjusted by country 
size in calculation. 49 
  
                                                           
48
 see http://taxfoundation.org/article/tax-reform-key-growing-economy-and-higher-living-standards-all-
americans-testimony-us-house. 
 
49
 http://taxfoundation.org/article/countdown-1-2011-marks-20th-year-us-corporate-tax-rate-higher-oecd-
average.  
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics 
 
Panel A: Descriptive statistics for multinational companies 
Variable Mean Q1 Median Q3 Std. Dev. N 
TXT 0.039 0.017 0.033 0.054 0.032 11356 
ETR 0.339 0.290 0.350 0.389 0.116 10760 
OCF 0.150 0.090 0.139 0.197 0.096 11356 
WC 0.022 -0.008 0.014 0.043 0.058 11356 
NDA 0.022 0.006 0.022 0.039 0.030 11356 
DA 0.000 -0.028 -0.006 0.019 0.047 11356 
NWC -0.053 -0.071 -0.048 -0.030 0.038 11356 
NOL 0.312 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.463 11356 
Size 6.507 5.180 6.458 7.779 1.840 11356 
Debt 0.172 0.012 0.133 0.267 0.176 11356 
R&D 0.043 0.000 0.019 0.064 0.058 11356 
AD 0.015 0.000 0.000 0.010 0.037 11356 
For TXT 0.011 0.002 0.007 0.015 0.014 11356 
Dom TXT 0.028 0.007 0.021 0.041 0.030 11356 
For ETR 0.335 0.231 0.329 0.418 0.166 6868 
Dom ETR 0.352 0.293 0.359 0.406 0.142 6868 
       
Market valuation variables: 
AR -0.001 -0.236 -0.046 0.169 0.412 6489 
∆Dom -0.005 -0.024 -0.001 0.018 0.055 6489 
∆For 0.000 -0.006 0.000 0.008 0.019 6489 
∆OCF -0.005 -0.037 -0.003 0.028 0.066 6489 
∆NDA 0.000 -0.016 0.000 0.017 0.035 6489 
∆DA_Dom -0.001 -0.008 -0.001 0.006 0.015 6489 
∆DA_For 0.000 -0.003 0.000 0.003 0.010 6489 
∆NWC 0.000 -0.014 -0.001 0.014 0.033 6489 
∆R&D 0.005 0.000 0.000 0.005 0.017 6489 
∆Int 0.001 -0.001 0.000 0.002 0.006 6489 
∆Div 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.033 6489 
∆Debt 0.204 0.046 0.186 0.308 0.178 6489 
NF 0.001 -0.033 0.000 0.016 0.099 6489 
       
Panel B: Descriptive statistics for domestic companies 
TXT 0.039 0.014 0.033 0.057 0.037 13736 
ETR 0.358 0.340 0.376 0.400 0.109 12648 
OCF 0.141 0.068 0.132 0.206 0.121 13736 
WC 0.035 -0.010 0.017 0.065 0.085 13736 
NDA 0.035 0.003 0.029 0.065 0.054 13736 
DA 0.000 -0.037 -0.009 0.025 0.060 13736 
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NWC -0.056 -0.077 -0.050 -0.028 0.047 13736 
NOL 0.169 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.375 13736 
Size 4.608 3.285 4.536 5.804 1.803 13736 
Debt 0.186 0.003 0.127 0.300 0.203 13736 
R&D 0.015 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.040 13736 
AD 0.015 0.000 0.000 0.010 0.039 13736 
 
Notes: This table provides descriptive statistics for the variables used in this study. See Appendix A for 
variable definitions. Panel A presents the distribution of key variables for multinational firm years that have 
positive pretax income (PI > 0). A firm is defined as multinational if it has non-zero current foreign tax 
expense (TXFO) or non-zero pretax foreign income (PIFO) throughout the sample period. When reporting 
the distribution of ETR, For ETR and Dom ETR, I separately require each variable to be between zero and 
one. Panel B presents the distribution of key variables for domestic firm years that have positive pretax 
income (PI > 0). A firm is defined as domestic if it has zero current foreign tax expense (TXFO) and zero 
pretax foreign income (PIFO) throughout the sample period. Panel C reports Pearson correlations among 
ETR measures, earnings components and firm characteristic variables for multinational companies with 
ETR between zero and one. P-value is reported in parentheses. All ratio variables are winsorized at the 1st 
and 99th percentiles by multinational and domestic separately. 
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Table 2. Estimates of ETR Applicable to Pretax Earnings Components  
 
Panel A: the dependent variable is total income tax expense 
 MNC 
(1) 
Domestic 
(2) 
OCF 0.361*** 0.329*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
   
OCF×NOL  -0.029** -0.038*** 
 (0.049) (0.009) 
   
OCF×Size -0.001 0.022*** 
 (0.668) (0.000) 
   
OCF×Debt 0.003 -0.123*** 
 (0.890) (0.001) 
   
OCF×AD -0.092 0.149 
 (0.336) (0.227) 
   
OCF×R&D -0.053 -0.155 
 (0.572) (0.392) 
   
WC 0.376*** 0.332*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
   
WC×NOL  -0.025 -0.050** 
 (0.470) (0.047) 
   
WC×Size 0.002 0.020*** 
 (0.803) (0.005) 
   
WC×Debt -0.061 -0.124** 
 (0.244) (0.017) 
   
WC×AD 0.011 0.329 
 (0.971) (0.121) 
   
WC×R&D 0.099 -0.159 
 (0.670) (0.676) 
   
DA -0.043*** 0.006 
 (0.001) (0.618) 
   
DA×NOL  -0.018 -0.026 
 (0.568) (0.282) 
   
DA×Size 0.010 0.005 
 (0.204) (0.465) 
   
DA×Debt 0.029 -0.001 
 (0.592) (0.986) 
   
DA×AD 0.138 -0.488** 
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 (0.722) (0.040) 
   
DA×R&D 0.190 0.014 
 (0.387) (0.970) 
   
NWC 0.323*** 0.352*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
   
NWC×NOL  0.001 0.005 
 (0.934) (0.814) 
   
NWC×Size -0.004 0.019*** 
 (0.498) (0.000) 
   
NWC×Debt -0.051 -0.093** 
 (0.272) (0.014) 
   
NWC×AD -0.223 -0.008 
 (0.151) (0.959) 
   
NWC×R&D -0.508*** -0.023 
 (0.001) (0.889) 
   
NOL -0.003*** -0.007*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
   
Size -0.000 0.001*** 
 (0.297) (0.000) 
   
Debt 0.005*** -0.005** 
 (0.004) (0.026) 
   
AD 0.010 -0.015 
 (0.254) (0.198) 
   
R&D -0.045*** -0.031 
 (0.000) (0.142) 
   
Constant 0.032*** 0.029*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
N 11356 13736 
adj. R2 0.77 0.70 
F 908.963 671.292 
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Figure 2. The Yearly ETR Difference between DA and NDA (βb1) for MNCs  
 
 
Notes: This table reports regression estimates based on equation (9). The sample consists of firm-year observations with positive pretax income. All 
continuous variables have been subtracted by their mean. Panel A presents the multivariate regression estimates. Column (1) is based on the MNC 
subsample of 11,356 observations. Column (2) is based on the domestic company subsample of 13,736 observations. Panel B estimates equation (9) 
for MNCs by each year and plots the coefficient estimates of DA (βb1) by year. The marker at each year is empty if the p-value of βb1 in this year is 
above 10% and is solid if the p-value of βb1 is below 10%. All variables are defined in Appendix A. All ratio variables are winsorized at the 1st and 
99th percentiles by MNC and domestic subsamples separately. P-value is reported in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered at firm and fiscal 
year level. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level (two-tailed test), respectively 
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Table 3. Estimates of ETR Associated with Foreign Expansion 
 
 Become MNCs 
OLS 
 
Become MNCs 
  (1) 1st Stage (2) 2nd Stage (3) 
    
MNC Expand -0.003  -0.019*** 
 (0.217)  (0.008) 
    
OCF 0.367***  0.400*** 
 (0.000)  (0.000) 
    
OCF	× MNC Expand 0.003  -0.083*** 
 (0.751)  (0.010) 
    
WC  0.357***  0.376*** 
 (0.000)  (0.000) 
    
WC	× MNC Expand 0.034**  -0.012 
 (0.046)  (0.819) 
    
DA -0.015  0.028 
 
(0.320)  (0.432) 
    
DA	× MNC Expand -0.039**  -0.130* 
 
(0.045)  (0.059) 
    
NWC 0.377***  0.436*** 
 (0.000)  (0.000) 
    
NWC × MNC 
Expand 
-0.017  -0.176* 
 (0.518)  (0.082) 
    
Capt-1  -2.745***  
  (0.000)  
    
ROAt-1  -1.718***  
  (0.000)  
    
Sizet-1  0.252***  
  (0.000)  
    
Debtt-1  0.051  
  (0.723)  
    
Controls?  Yes  Yes 
    
N 4055 3120 3113 
adj. R2 0.79 0.11 0.85 
Industry fixed effect? No Yes No 
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Notes: This table reports regression estimates adapted from equation (9). All continuous variables have 
been subtracted by their mean. The sample consists of firms that have zero current foreign tax expense 
(TXFO) and zero pretax foreign income (PIFO) in the first sample year and non-zero current foreign tax 
expense (TXFO) or non-zero pretax foreign income (PIFO) in latter sample years. This generates 4,055 
firm-year observations. MNC Expand is equal to one for the first sample year of foreign operation 
reported and all subsequent sample years. Column (1) is based on the OLS regression. Column (2) and (3) 
address the endogenous decision of foreign expansion. Column (2) reports the first-stage Probit 
regression with industry fixed effect. The dependent variable is MNC Expand and the regression 
generates predicted probabilities of foreign expansion. In column (3) the second stage regression, the 
predicted probabilities of foreign expansion are interacted with each pretax earnings component. For 
presentation purpose, control variables reported in Table 2 are not separately reported. All variables are 
defined in Appendix A. All ratio variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. P-value is 
reported in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered at firm level. ***, **, and * denote significance at 
the 1%, 5% and 10% level (two-tailed test), respectively.  
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Table 4. Estimates of Domestic and Foreign ETR  
 
 For TXT 
(1) 
Dom TXT  
(2) 
OCF 0.061*** 0.281*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
   
WC 0.074*** 0.278*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
   
DA -0.031** -0.002 
 (0.017) (0.904) 
   
NWC 0.034*** 0.283*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
   
Controls? Yes Yes 
N 11356 11356 
adj. R2 0.13 0.59 
 
Notes: This table reports regression estimates adapted from equation (9). All continuous variables have 
been subtracted by their mean. In column (1), the dependent variable is For TXT, the total foreign 
income tax expense as the sum of foreign current income tax expense (TXFO) and foreign deferred 
income tax expense (TXDFO). In column (2), the dependent variable is Dom TXT, the total domestic 
income tax expense as the sum of federal current income tax expense (TXFED) and federal deferred 
income tax expense (TXDFO). I add state current income tax expense (TXS) to federal current income 
tax expense (TXFED) if TXS is available. I add state deferred income tax expense (TXDS) to federal 
deferred income tax expense (TXDFO) if TXDS is available. I also use the following steps to replace 
missing values of variables above:  
 1) If TXDFED is missing and TXDFO is equal to TXDI, I replace TXDFED to zero. 
 2) If TXDFO is missing and TXDFED is equal to TXDI, I replace TXDFO to zero.  
 3) If TXDFED is missing and TXDFO and TXDI are not missing, I replace TXDFED to (TXDI-
TXDFO). 
 4) If TXDFO is missing and TXDI and TXDFED are not missing, I replace TXDFO to (TXDI-
TXDFED). 
 
After steps above, I replace TXDFED as zero if TXDFED is still missing and replace TXDFO as 
(TXDI-TXDFED) if TXDFO is still missing. Both For TXT and Dom TXT are scaled by the average 
assets of fiscal year t-1 and fiscal year t. For presentation purpose, control variables reported in Table 2 
are not separately reported. All variables are defined in Appendix A. All ratio variables are winsorized 
at the 1st and 99th percentiles. P-value is reported in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered at firm 
and fiscal year level. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level (two-tailed test), 
respectively. 
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Table 5. Market Valuation by Foreign and Domestic Activities 
 
Panel A: the dependent variable is abnormal market return during fiscal year t 
 Foreign/Domestic Earnings 
(1) 
Foreign/Domestic Managed 
Earnings 
(2) 
∆Dom 1.392***  
 (0.000)  
   
∆For 2.204***  
 (0.000)  
∆OCF  1.509*** 
  (0.000) 
   
∆NDA  1.386** 
  (0.010) 
   
∆DA_Dom  1.446*** 
  (0.001) 
   
∆DA_For  1.245** 
  (0.043) 
   
∆NWC  0.754*** 
  (0.000) 
   
∆R&D 1.597*** 1.542*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
   
∆Int -0.668 -0.869 
 (0.478) (0.367) 
   
∆Div -0.026 -0.039 
 (0.826) (0.760) 
   
∆Debt -0.119*** -0.127*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
   
NF 0.164** 0.162** 
 (0.027) (0.049) 
   
Constant 0.034 0.038 
 (0.229) (0.209) 
Industry dummies? Yes Yes 
N 6489 6489 
adj. R2 0.06 0.04 
   
Panel B: F-test of 
coefficients 
  
∆For – ∆Dom = 0 5.95**  
(p-value) (0.014)  
∆DA_For - ∆DA_Dom 
= 0  
 0.06 
(p-value)  (0.801) 
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Panel C: ETR estimates applicable to foreign and domestic discretionary accruals in year t 
 DA_Dom DA_For 
ETR estimate 0.412*** 0.141*** 
 (0.000) (0.007) 
   
Panel D: F-test of 
coefficients 
  
DA_Dom - DA_For = 0 22.19*** 
(p-value) (0.000) 
 
Notes: This table reports market valuation regressions. In Panel A, the dependent variable is excess 
stock market return of firm i in fiscal year t, minus the benchmark return of Fama and French (1993) 25 
size and book-to-market portfolios formed at the beginning of fiscal year t. Column (1) examines the 
market valuation of domestic and foreign pretax earnings based on equation (11). Column (2) examines 
the market valuation of domestic and foreign pretax managed earnings based on equation (17). Panel B 
reports F-test results of the coefficients in Panel A. Panel C reports ETR estimates adapted from 
equation (9). I regress total income tax on decomposed worldwide discretionary accruals by foreign 
discretionary accruals (DA_For), domestic discretionary accruals (DA_Dom) and the residual 
component in a framework similar to equation (9). The coefficients of DA_For and DA_Dom can be 
interpreted as the ETR applicable to DA_For and DA_Dom in year t. Panel D reports F-test results of 
the coefficients in Panel C. All variables are defined in Appendix A. All ratio variables are winsorized 
at the 1st and 99th percentiles. P-value is reported in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered at firm 
level. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level (two-tailed test), respectively. 
  
61 
 
Table 6. Earnings Management Settings 
 
Panel A: the dependent variable is total income tax expense (TXT) 
 Small 
Earnings 
Increase 
(1) 
Meet or Beat 
forecasts 
(2) 
Top DA 
Quartile 
(3) 
Bottom DA 
Quartile 
(4) 
OCF 0.351*** 0.344*** 0.360*** 0.365*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
     
WC 0.336*** 0.344*** 0.407*** 0.378*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
     
DA -0.011 0.029 -0.132*** 0.010 
 (0.644) (0.325) (0.008) (0.944) 
     
NWC 0.337*** 0.340*** 0.318*** 0.328*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
     
EM -0.001* -0.001   
 (0.057) (0.321)   
     
EM× OCF 0.008 0.002   
 (0.313) (0.813)   
     
EM× WC 0.031 0.001   
 (0.296) (0.979)   
     
EM× DA -0.016 -0.012   
 (0.540) (0.731)   
     
EM× NWC 0.008 -0.032   
 (0.557) (0.113)   
     
Controls? Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 4340 3341 866 867 
adj. R2 0.83 0.84 0.68 0.73 
     
Panel B: ETR comparison for the top and bottom DA quartiles 
 Top DA Quartile Bottom DA Quartile Mean 
difference 
For ETR 29.5% 31.8% 2.3%*** 
Dom ETR 26.9% 25.3% -1.6%** 
 
Notes: This table reports regression estimates adapted from equation (9) for three different settings in 
which earnings management is likely to occur: 1) avoiding a small earnings decline; 2) avoiding 
missing analysts’ forecasts; 3) using large magnitude of income-increasing discretionary accruals. The 
sample consists of MNC observations that have positive pretax income. All continuous variables have 
been subtracted by their mean. Column (1) examines the earnings management setting in which 
managers manage earnings to avoid a small earnings decline. The subsample requires that the pretax 
earnings change from year t-1 to year t, scaled by equity market value in year t-2 (∆PI/MVt-2), is 
between -0.02 and 0.02. EM is an indicator variable equal to one if the pretax earnings change is above 
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zero and less than 0.02. Column (2) examines the earnings management setting in which managers 
manage earnings to avoid missing analysts’ forecasts. The subsample requires that earnings forecast 
error is between -0.01 and 0.01. The forecast error is calculated as the difference between EPS from 
actual earnings announcement and the median EPS forecasted by analysts in the month of earnings 
announcement. EM is an indicator variable equal to one if the earnings forecast error is above zero and 
less than 0.01. In column (3) and (4), I sort income increasing discretionary accruals (DA>0) in fiscal 
year t into quartiles and I also require that the discretionary accruals in fiscal year t-1 is positive. 
Column (3) examines the earnings management setting based on the top income increasing discretionary 
accrual quartile, and Column (4) examines the benchmark setting based on the bottom income 
increasing discretionary accrual quartile. Panel B reports the average foreign ETR (For ETR) and 
domestic ETR (Dom ETR) for the top and bottom discretionary accrual quartiles separately. I require 
both For ETR and Dom ETR to be between zero and one. The sample mean difference and related 
statistical significance are reported. For presentation purpose, control variables reported in Table 2 are 
not separately reported. All variables are defined in Appendix A. All ratio variables are winsorized at 
the 1st and 99th percentiles. P-value is reported in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered at firm and 
fiscal year level. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level (two-tailed test), 
respectively. 
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Table 7. Estimates of ETR Applicable to Pretax Earnings Components 
(Performance Matched Discretionary Accruals) 
 
 MNC 
(1) 
Domestic 
(2) 
OCF 0.355*** 0.329*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
   
WC 0.358*** 0.331*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
   
DA_per -0.025** 0.009 
 (0.028) (0.290) 
   
NWC 0.322*** 0.354*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
   
Controls? Yes Yes 
N 11356 13736 
adj. R2 0.77 0.70 
 
Notes: This table reports regression estimates based on equation (9) using performance matched 
discretionary accruals. The sample consists of MNC and domestic firm-year observations that have 
positive pretax income. All continuous variables have been subtracted by their mean. For presentation 
purpose, control variables reported in Table 2 are not separately reported. All variables are defined in 
Appendix A. All ratio variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. P-value is reported in 
parentheses. Standard errors are clustered at firm and fiscal year level. ***, **, and * denote 
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level (two-tailed test), respectively. 
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Table 8. Market Valuation by Foreign and Domestic Activities (Performance 
Matched Discretionary Accruals)  
 
Panel A: the dependent variable is abnormal market return during fiscal year t 
 Foreign/Domestic Managed Earnings 
(1) 
∆OCF 1.188*** 
 (0.000) 
  
∆NDA 0.603** 
 (0.043) 
  
∆DA_Dom_per 0.911** 
 (0.033) 
  
∆DA_For_per 0.992* 
 (0.074) 
  
∆NWC 0.886*** 
 (0.000) 
  
∆R&D 1.491*** 
 (0.000) 
  
∆Int -1.103 
 (0.291) 
  
∆Div -0.049 
 (0.657) 
  
∆Debt -0.124*** 
 (0.000) 
  
NF 0.161** 
 (0.031) 
  
Constant 0.038 
 (0.207) 
Industry dummies Yes 
N 6489 
adj. R2 0.04 
  
Panel B: F-test of coefficients  
∆DA_For_per - ∆DA_Dom_per = 0 0.01 
(p-value) (0.916) 
 
Notes: This table reports market valuation regression based on equation (17) using performance 
matched discretionary accruals. The sample consists of MNC observations that have positive pretax 
income. In Panel A, the dependent variable is excess stock market return of firm i in fiscal year t, minus 
the benchmark return of Fama and French (1993) 25 size and book-to-market portfolios formed at the 
beginning of fiscal year t. Panel B reports F-test results of the coefficients in Panel A. All variables are 
defined in Appendix A. All ratio variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. Industry fixed 
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effect is included and industries are defined based on Fama-French 12 industries. P-value is reported in 
parentheses. Standard errors are clustered at firm level. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% 
and 10% level (two-tailed test), respectively. 
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Table 9. Market Valuation by Foreign and Domestic Activities (Include Residual 
Discretionary Accruals)  
 
Panel A: the dependent variable is abnormal market return during fiscal year t 
 Foreign/Domestic Managed Earnings 
(1) 
∆OCF 1.408*** 
 (0.000) 
  
∆NDA 1.321*** 
 (0.001) 
  
∆DA_Dom 1.575*** 
 (0.000) 
  
∆DA_For 1.249** 
 (0.022) 
  
∆Residual -0.606*** 
 (0.002) 
  
∆NWC 0.633*** 
 (0.001) 
  
∆R&D 1.588*** 
 (0.000) 
  
∆Int -0.820 
 (0.432) 
  
∆Div -0.031 
 (0.786) 
  
∆Debt -0.124*** 
 (0.000) 
  
NF 0.191** 
 (0.011) 
  
Constant 0.036 
 (0.224) 
Industry dummies Yes 
N 6489 
adj. R2 0.04 
  
Panel B: F-test of coefficients  
∆DA_For - ∆DA_Dom = 0 0.20 
(p-value) (0.652) 
 
Notes: This table reports market valuation regression of equation (17) by including the change of 
residual discretionary accruals (∆Residual). The sample consists of MNC observations that have 
positive pretax income. In Panel A, ∆Residual is the change of residual discretionary accruals (∆eit) in 
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equation (15). Panel B reports F-test results of the coefficients in Panel A. All variables are defined in 
Appendix A. All ratio variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. Industry fixed effect is 
included and industries are defined based on Fama-French 12 industries. P-value is reported in 
parentheses. Standard errors are clustered at firm level. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% 
and 10% level (two-tailed test), respectively. 
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Table 10. Market Valuation by Foreign and Domestic Activities (After-tax)  
 
Panel A: the dependent variable is abnormal market return during fiscal year t 
 Foreign/Domestic 
Earnings 
(1) 
Foreign/Domestic 
Managed Earnings 
(2) 
∆Dom_after_tax 1.775***  
 (0.000)  
   
∆For_after_tax 3.218***  
 (0.000)  
∆OCF_after_tax  1.462*** 
  (0.000) 
   
∆NDA_after_tax  1.099** 
  (0.022) 
   
∆DA_Dom_after_tax  1.289*** 
  (0.001) 
   
∆DA_For_after_tax  1.297** 
  (0.017) 
   
∆NWC_after_tax  0.903*** 
  (0.002) 
 
  
∆R&D 1.650*** 1.573*** 
 (0.001) (0.002) 
   
∆Int -0.020 -0.974 
 (0.989) (0.513) 
   
∆Div 0.010 -0.043 
 (0.932) (0.705) 
   
∆Debt -0.132*** -0.135*** 
 (0.005) (0.005) 
   
NF 0.270*** 0.298*** 
 (0.010) (0.006) 
   
Constant 0.037 0.030 
 (0.297) (0.388) 
Industry dummies Yes  Yes 
N 3801 3801 
adj. R2 0.06 0.04 
   
Panel B: F-test of coefficients   
∆For_after_tax – ∆Dom_after_tax = 0 8.62***  
(p-value) (0.003)  
∆DA_For_after_tax - 
∆DA_Dom_after_tax = 0  
 0.00 
(p-value)  (0.991) 
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Notes: This table reports market valuation regression of equation (17) by using after-tax earnings 
components. The sample consists of MNC observations that have positive pretax income. ∆ indicates 
the change of a variable from fiscal year t-1 to fiscal year t. Panel B reports F-test results of the 
coefficients in Panel A. All variables are defined in Appendix A. All ratio variables are winsorized at 
the 1st and 99th percentiles. Industry fixed effect is included and industries are defined based on Fama-
French 12 industries. P-value is reported in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered at firm level. ***, 
**, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level (two-tailed test), respectively. 
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Table 11. Estimates of Weighted Statutory Tax Rate Applicable to Pretax 
Earnings Components  
 
 MNC 
(1) 
Domestic 
(2) 
OCF 0.347*** 0.328*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
   
WC 0.359*** 0.322*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
   
DA -0.040*** -0.012 
 (0.005) (0.378) 
   
NWC 0.312*** 0.346*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
   
R&D -0.036*** -0.075*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
   
AD 0.015* 0.007 
 (0.081) (0.573) 
   
Int Rev 0.118** 0.115** 
 (0.020) (0.029) 
   
Amort 0.092** 0.123 
 (0.033) (0.103) 
   
Stock Comp -0.039*** -0.016 
 (0.000) (0.256) 
   
Net Div 0.005 -0.055*** 
 (0.429) (0.000) 
   
Net Invest 0.004 -0.004* 
 (0.156) (0.057) 
   
Manufacture -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.156) (0.425) 
   
MI 0.072 -0.083 
 (0.327) (0.323) 
   
Constant -0.002* 0.002 
 (0.063) (0.156) 
N 7112 8580 
adj. R2 0.76 0.67 
 
Notes: This table reports regression estimates based on equation (22). The sample consists of MNC and 
domestic firm-year observations that have positive pretax income. All variables are defined in section 
6.5.1 and Appendix A. All ratio variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles by MNC and 
domestic subsamples separately. P-value is reported in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered at firm 
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and fiscal year level. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level (two-tailed test), 
respectively.  
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Table 12. Estimates of Weighted Statutory Tax Rate Applicable to Pretax 
Earnings Components for Firms that Become MNCs 
 
 Become MNC 
(1) 
MNC Expand -0.006* 
 (0.064) 
  
OCF 0.347*** 
 (0.000) 
  
OCF	× MNC Expand 0.028* 
 (0.068) 
  
WC  0.325*** 
 (0.000) 
  
WC	× MNC Expand 0.053* 
 (0.092) 
  
DA -0.009 
 (0.660) 
  
DA	× MNC Expand -0.062* 
 (0.058) 
  
NWC 0.365*** 
 (0.000) 
  
NWC × MNC Expand 0.015 
 (0.598) 
  
Controls?  Yes 
  
N 2542 
adj. R2 0.76 
 
Notes: This table reports regression estimates from equation (22). The sample consists of firm-years that 
have positive pretax income and become MNCs during the sample period. Only observations with 
positive pretax income are included. The subsample is defined in Table 3. For presentation purpose, 
control variables reported in Table 11 are not separately reported. All variables are defined in section 
6.5.1 and Appendix A. All ratio variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. P-value is 
reported in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered at firm and fiscal year level. ***, **, and * denote 
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level (two-tailed test), respectively 
  
73 
 
Table 13. Estimates of Domestic and Foreign Statutory Tax Rate Applicable to 
Pretax Earnings Components 
 
 For TXT 
(1) 
Dom TXT  
(2) 
OCF 0.085*** 0.281*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
   
WC 0.117*** 0.260*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
   
DA -0.061** 0.022 
 (0.034) (0.622) 
   
NWC 0.041** 0.275*** 
 (0.013) (0.000) 
   
Control variables? Yes Yes 
N 7105 7105 
adj. R2 0.14 0.43 
 
Notes: This table reports regression estimates from equation (22) based on the MNC subsample. The 
sample consists of MNC and domestic firm-year observations that have positive pretax income. In 
column (1), the dependent variable is total foreign income tax expense (For TXT). In column (2), the 
dependent variable is total domestic income tax expense (Dom TXT). See Table 4 for the definition of 
domestic and foreign income tax expense. For presentation purpose, control variables reported in Table 
12 are not separately reported. All variables are defined in section 6.5.1 and Appendix A. All ratio 
variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. P-value is reported in parentheses. Standard 
errors are clustered at firm and fiscal year level. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 
10% level (two-tailed test), respectively.  
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